UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
        WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
	Bryson City Division

        ____________________________________________
                                                   |
             WILLIAM C. HAMMEL,                    |     MEMORANDUM IN
             ALAN J. BELLAMENTE,                   |     RESPONSE TO
             et al.,                               |     DEFENDANTS'
                                                   |     MEMORANDUM IN
                  Plaintiffs                       |     RESPONSE TO
                                                   |     PLAINTIFFS'
                   vs.                             |     OBJECTIONS TO
                                                   |     MEMORANDUM AND      
             STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE          |     RECOMMENDATION
             INSURANCE CO., et al.;                |
                                                   |
                                                   |     No. 2:99CV-44-T
             STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANY,         |
             et al.                                |
                                                   |
                  Defendants                       |
                                                   |
        ___________________________________________|


			     PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS



	1) Now, Defendants, in a Memorandum dated May 10, 2000 oppose

	Plaintiffs' Objections to the Magistrate's Memorandum and

	Recommendation, that Plaintiffs be dismissed with prejudice.



	2) Plaintiffs are truly sick and tired of Defendants' contumlies;

	of being ridiculed for their pro se status, being similarly

	declared, one way or another, to be incompetent idiots, who as

	Defendants would have it, misapprehend all law and all reality,

	when in fact, it is Defendants who have steadfastly refused to

	acknowledge both the facts of the case, as well as the governing

	law, citing cases that are misapplications of law, and now

	attempting to revise the very history of this litigation.




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	3) Almost all of these misapprehensions by Defendants have already

	been addressed in legal and logical detail by Plaintiffs: their

	citations of cases that are not binding on the 4th circuit have

	been omitted.



	4) Defendants seem to write legal documents in a manner all

	too similar to the purported "medical reviews" of Dr. Fremed.

	Untruths repeated over and over are supposed to convince

	the Court, though evidence exists which contradicts them.



	5) To say that this "Response" of Defendants is frivolous,

	is to say the very least.  It expresses their determination,

	in the face of reality to the contrary, to transform this

	matter into some simple insurance case which has been

	allegedly settled.  The facts do not support this position,

	and never have.



	6) Plaintiffs in their own style, will eschew Defendants

	style of unwarranted and unsupportable glittering generalities,

	and address expressions of Defendants' gratuitous, frivolous

	and harassing Response.  As in the past, Plaintiffs follow the

	outline form of Defendants' Memorandum, in their rebuttal.



	A.

	7) Even in page one, a relevant point of history, that Plaintiffs

	submitted a "Motion to Amend" only because it was ordered

	by the Magistrate, is omitted.  This crucial event is ignored

	and suppressed by Defendants, apparently in the hope that

	if it is not mentioned, it will be forgotten by the Court.

                                       - 2 -










	8) The referred to "Amended Complaint" does not yet exist since

	it has never been filed.  To apply rule 8(a) is mostly at the

	discretion of the District Court supplementing its considerations

	by other factors such as alleged facts, the complexity of the

	alleged facts and claims as well as the merits of the claims,

	as there are no limits stated in the rules, and there is no case

	law that determines absolute limits, on the length of a complaint.



	9) Considering the undue and permanent burden that Defendants have

	placed on Plaintiffs' lives, and considering the relative

	wealth and resources of Plaintiffs and Defendants, to claim

	undue burden on Defendants that they should be required to

	answer a complaint of length, which is, per force, of their own

	making, is ludicrous.



	10) Even in  Plaintiffs submitted "proposed amended complaint",

	each paragraph is answerable or avoidable since the required

	specificity, as far as Plaintiffs are able, has been provided

	regarding time, place and person.



	11) In a short period of time, determined by Defendants and

	Magistrate, Plaintiffs did produce, under great physical

	hardship and expense, a "proposed amended complaint" which

	has never been filed, and which Plaintiffs subsequently

	withdrew for correction before the Magistrate's Recommendation

	was filed.  It is difficult to imagine that rule 8(a) may be

	applied to a document that has never been filed, and on that


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	basis that an entire case be dismissed, ignoring its merits

	in fact.



	12) Defendants attempt, through twists, turns, and careful

	omissions, to argue that this procedure is somehow proper,

	when very clearly, it is not.



	B.

	13) The first paragraph is a collection of half and

	incomplete truths.



	14) In their PIP releases, Plaintiffs did not grant State Farm

	Indemnity Company (SFI) release for future torts; they certainly

	released no other person of anything.  The criminal torts alleged

	by Plaintiffs begin at the time of their claims, and were not even

	suspected by Plaintiffs until approximately a year later, months

	after their claims were denied.  There is indeed a period of

	reliance contrary to Defendants' contentions.  The commission

	and conspiracies to commit criminal torts continued into the

	the time of litigation.  Most importantly, commissions and

	conspiracies to commit further torts extended beyond the signing

	of the PIP releases that are supposed to protect Defendants

	through Res Judicata.  This has been examined in excruciating

	detail in Plaintiffs' Response (# 28).



	15) Defendants have consistently refused to acknowledge, Plaintiffs

	provable allegations, Cf. (# 28, and # 37), as well as the

	recorded, binding and cited opinions of the 4th Circuit therein

	that show Res Judicata not to be applicable.

                                       - 4 -










	16) Plaintiffs, having signed the PIP releases in good faith,

	have yet to be satisfied by the accord, and understand that

	to be so would require yet another law suit in New Jersey.



	17) Defendants seem to be of the strange opinion that because

	the State of New Jersey simply does not recognize bad faith

	for tortious actions in that State that Defendant SFI should

	somehow not be held accountable for egregious and criminal

	actions post-dating Plaintiffs' PIP releases, committed against

	residents of North Carolina through conspiracy and actions by

	State Farm Mutual, SFI's attorneys in New Jersey and SFI's

	medical "hired gun", Dr. Eric L. Fremed.



	18) Should Defendants' opinion be held valid, it would place all

	insurers in the position of doing whatever it is they please,

	regardless of egregiousness or criminality, and beyond being held

	accountable under law.  Plaintiffs leave the consequences of

	that to be considered by the Court.



	19) Shortly after Plaintiffs submitted their "proposed amended

	complaint",  SFI's Counsel in New Jersey, Melli Guerin & Melli,

	approached Plaintiffs' Attorneys in New Jersey, apparently

	believing them to be hidden Counsel behind the current Federal

	litigation, asking directly or indirectly whether this was the

	case and whether these Plaintiffs would drop this Federal suit

	if they proffered the limits of the UIM policy.  To Plaintiffs'

	knowledge, no answer was ever given to this last question.


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	20) Yet, the UIM limits were offered and Plaintiffs understood that

	if those limits were not accepted, SFI could, through Counsel,

	move to dismiss.



	21) Plaintiffs signed these very limited releases, allowing that

	further litigation under the UIM policies, and only that, would

	be barred.  Plaintiffs have agreed, and the limits of the policy,

	after six years, has finally been paid.  Copies of of these releases

	are attached as exhibits 1 and 2.



	22) Now, addressing Defendants' second paragraph of section B:



	23) Defendants assert, "Thus, (1) it has been adjudicated that

	Plaintiffs have no punitive damage claims, (2) Plaintiffs have

	settled and released their PIP and bad faith claims, and (3) Plaintiffs

	have settled and released the UIM claims.  These settlements,

	releases and stipulations of dismissal have resolved all claims

	arising from Plaintiffs' insurance policy with State Farm

	Indemnity and State Farm's handling of their insurance claims."



	24) Regarding '(3)' of this assertion, Plaintiffs agree.



	25) Regarding '(1)',  Plaintiffs read a vast and convenient

	simplification and even perversion of the truth.



	26) What was adjudicated, at the time of Judge Harris's

	Order, filed April 18, 1997 submitted here to this Court

	as exhibit 3, is that under New Jersey's statutes

                                       - 6 -








	and case law, a cause of action did not exist.

	See exhibits of Plaintiffs' Objections (# 46).



	27) That was then; this is now.  Since that time, further

	tortious and criminal acts have been committed by Defendants

	against both Plaintiffs as residents of North Carolina.

	These acts are not, and cannot be exculpated by that Order

	of Judge Harris in New Jersey.



	28) Moreover, as Plaintiffs have stressed before, this dismissal

	was not based on merits, even at that time.

	

	29) Regarding '(2)',  Plaintiffs again read a vast and convenient

	simplification and perversion of the truth.



	30) The releases of UIM claims were, as previously stated for

	those claims and for those those claims only.



	31) Plaintiffs have not released any future claims for anything

	to anybody.



	32) The PIP releases themselves were secured by a fraud upon which

	Plaintiffs relied to their detriment.



	33) Regarding the last sentence of this section, quoted from

	Defendants' response:



	34) Plaintiffs' claims do not arise from acts that are governed


                                       - 7 -







	by insurance law.  This is a fact that Defendants have attempted

	and still attempt to subvert, ignore, and deny explicitly and

	implicitly by fabricated assumptions and subsequent tortuous

	involutions of argument.



	35) Bad faith is not a matter of insurance law; it is a matter of

	contract law.  Federal RICO has nothing to do with insurance

	per se.  Criminal torts connected through a pattern of racketeering

	have been committed upon Plaintiffs as residents of North Carolina,

	in a period longer than those committed on the same Plaintiffs as

	residents of the State of New Jersey.



	36) What insurance claims were made possible by the State

	of New Jersey have now, indeed, been settled.



	37) The egregiously criminal claims that supersede those claims

	are far from being settled.  Undisputable, is that egregiously

	criminal acts committed by Defendants have been committed 

	after any agreement or release that may have been entered into

	by Plaintiffs.

	

	38) Plaintiffs have "recast" nothing.  After periods of reliance

	that "surely State law would provide relief" and that the

	Defendants would understand the havoc that they have wrought,

	Plaintiffs understand that the management of SFM from the

	top down is the very definition of corruption, and that an

	end must be put to that corruption as it saps the life blood

	of our country's economy and existence.  That "insurer fraud"

	far outweighs "insurance fraud" is a fact for which Plaintiffs

                                       - 8 -








	will supply ample proof.



	39) To this point, Plaintiffs can produce expert witnesses at

	a trial.



	C.

        40) Just who is misapprehending what?



	41) Defendants' contentions are nothing but arrogant nonsense

	masquerading as some kind of legal authority that can freely

	ignore material facts.



	42) Defendants contend in their second paragraph, "They [Plaintiffs]

	seek to create a new cause of action under RICO for conduct

	that was at issue in their prior litigation."  This is completely

	false, as Plaintiffs have alleged repeatedly and consistently,

	starting, e.g., in their Response (# 28), 5), page 14, through

	Objections (# 46), paragraphs 26-28.



	43) Moreover, for Defendants to claim Res Judicata, asserting

	falsehoods is not sufficient under North Carolina law; they

	must prove sufficiency. Cf. Objections (# 46), paragraph 34.



	44) In the sentence directly following that quoted above, Defendants',

	referencing paragraphs 20 and 25 in Plaintiffs' Objections (# 46),

	state, "They also appear to want to allege injury to, and proceed

	on behalf of, 'The People of the United States of America' and

	'the general public'.", asserting that such essential elements


                                       - 9 -







	as reliance and proximate cause are absent.



	45) The "American People" have reasonable expectations that insurance

	is real, and they rely upon the insurance industry to provide the

	insurance for which they pay.  State Farm Mutual together with all

	its incorporated wholly owned subsidiaries is indisputably the

	largest insurer in the United States.  When such an insurer routinely

	denies claims made under devastating circumstances to the degree that

	it does, to that degree those whose claims are denied suffer direct

	and proximate injury to their business and property, often to the

	point of becoming dependent upon US social agencies that compensate

	for such an insurer's racketeering which has transformed the

	legitimate business of insurance into an indifferent and rapacious

	"profit making center" Cf. Plaintiffs' Memorandum (# 30).



	46) The American People unknowingly and unwillingly pay for these

	social services, while the insurer uses and derives profits

	from the insured's premiums through a pattern of racketeering,

	and also uses and derives profits from the money that it has

	illegally withheld from its insureds.  This is an admixture of

	extortion and robbery.



	47) Because most of the American People pay unknowingly, their injuries

	have not even accrued.



	48) Every time State Farm transfers its obligation to pay, to any

	public assistance program it is stealing from every citizen

	of the United States for its own unjust enrichment.



                                       - 10 -








	49) As to the "general public", Objections (# 46), paragraph 25

	in itself is clear and to the point.



	50) Every time State Farm denies a legitimate claim, it leaves

	helpless another injured member of the general public.  This

	certainly effects the "health of the general public", and

	even affects interstate commerce.



	51) In the sentence following, Defendants state: "They also

	persist in denying the legal significance of the contract

	of insurance that is the source of any claim they might

	have had against Defendants (Objections paragraphs 9, 20),

	seeking instead to conjure up a multiplicity of tort claims

	out of a relationship governed by contract.  This approach

	was specifically disapproved by the Fourth Circuit in

	Broussard v. Meineke Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331 346,

	359 (1998)."

	

	52) Defendants misapprehend and once again misapply the very

	case that they cite.



	53) Broussard is a complex class action suit brought by Franchisees

	against Franchisors.  The plaintiffs class action certification

	was found invalid.  These plaintiffs brought the action based on

	contractual violations as well as independent torts claiming

	the franchisor to be a fiduciary.  It is this alleged fiduciary

	relationship upon which the tort claims were based.  While

	the Broussard Court found no error with the contractual claims,


                                       - 11 -







	it did so with the tort claims.  The reasoning of the Court

	is that there was, in fact, no fiduciary relation since Plaintiffs

	and Defendants stood on equal ground and that neither had a

	superior position within the contract.



	54) Very clearly this is not the situation in the current litigation;

	an insurer does, indeed, have a relationship as fiduciary to

	its insureds, and therein lies the misapplication by Defendants.



	55) In fact, the Court in Broussard at paragraph 73, referencing

	the David and Goliath metaphor notes, "... size, as that

	story teaches, is not a reliable indicator of strength or

	influence.  Nor is it what North Carolina Courts mean by

	superiority.  Only when one party figuratively holds all the

	cards -- all the financial power or technical information,

	for example -- have North Carolina Courts found that the

	'special circumstance' of a fiduciary relationship has arisen."



	56) Defendants have repeatedly cited Broussard on this issue of

	tort claims; every one of them is a misapplication of case

	law.  Surely, Defendants' attorney knew or should have known

	the actual issues in Broussard since it was, in fact, an

	attorney in that case; in any case Broussard should never

	have been cited by Defendants as an authority without actually

	reading it, understanding it and taking in account the precise

	points of law that were at issue in the Court's considerations.

	

	57) Any dismissal of bad faith claims by the court in New Jersey

	effects only acts committed before filing or alternatively

                                       - 12 -








	before the Order of the Court.  Plaintiffs' fundamental

	causes of action arise from acts committed after that.



	58) Fiduciary duties of the insurer persist into and in some

	cases (White v. Western Title Co., 40 Cal 3d 870, Sup.

	Ct. of Calif., December 31, 1965) beyond litigation as does

	the duty of Good Faith.



	59) Plaintiffs fundamental claims are based on acts that post-date

	the New Jersey Court's dismissal of Bad Faith and punitive

	damages.  These claims are extracontractual in nature.



	60) Although Plaintiffs have asserted claims prior to litigation,

	they are mere background, asserted to lend credence to the

	pattern of claims based upon alleged criminal acts that post-date

	the dismissals of Bad Faith claims and also post-date the PIP

	releases.  Theses acts and timing have been alleged and are

	provable by a preponderance of evidence.  The Court may also

	consider these claims in determining whether or not Plaintiffs

	have sufficiently alleged a pattern of racketeering.



	61) Plaintiffs have alleged, with good reason, that both the "policy"

	and the PIP releases were entered into by Defendant SFI,

	with fraudulent intent.  Such contracts are not binding

	on Plaintiffs.

	

	62) Plaintiffs understand very well the significance and also

	the insignificance of these fraudulent purported contracts,


                                       - 13 -







	and have not conjured up but rather collected a multiplicity

	of tort claims that are contractual as well as extracontractual

	which arise from acts during litigation, and after litigation,

	which is to say after the purported accords and satisfactions.

	This has been repeatedly and consistently ignored by Defendants.

	Fraud, extortion and robbery are not governed by any law of

	contract; they are criminal acts.  The "ostrich gambit" is not

	a form of proper legal defense.



	63) Regarding the last paragraph of this section C of Defendants'

	Memorandum,  Plaintiffs have never requested the indulgence

	of the Court regarding the sufficiency of their pleadings,

	nor do they expect indulgence in this respect.  Any requested

	indulgence, if it be indulgence, is consideration of their

	physical disabilities and medically necessary treatments.

	

	64) Defendants have repeatedly claimed, as some sort of mantra,

	"Plaintiffs misapprehensions of fundamental legal concepts",

	as well as misapprehension of almost everything under the

	sun, while providing not even a hint as to where these

	misapprehensions might lie, or providing legitimate citations

	of case law where an error or legal argument has been

	found.  Defendants have regularly misapplied case law that

	they have cited, and Plaintiffs have rigorously shown this.

	Defendants have repeatedly refused to acknowledge the

	understanding of Fourth Circuit regarding Res Judicata,

	and repeatedly refuse to acknowledge Plaintiffs' actual

	pleadings, while objecting in the form of glittering

	generalities.  Plaintiffs leave it to the Court to decide

                                       - 14 -








	on the basis of filings, who misapprehends what.



	65) Cognizable claims are present in Plaintiffs' pleadings,

	in the alleged facts, facts which Defendants have only

	addressed in attempts to make them mean something other

	than what has been specifically stated.



	66) A Plaintiff, pro se, is entitled, whether or not some attorneys

	may view them as second class citizens before the Court, to

	pursue a complex multiparty litigation that may have extensive

	pleadings because the acts of the defendants have created the

	complexity of the extensiveness.  To the Court, Plaintiffs

	apologize for this necessity; to the Defendants nothing more

	can be said on this issue.



	67) It is not the duty of Plaintiffs, in their pleadings, to

	provide a framework within which a defense may be framed.

	It may very well be that there is no defense.  The duty

	is to provide allegations which are, in principle, answerable,

	and causes of action that are sufficiently plead so that

	they may, at least, be argued, and subjected to scruntiy

	before provable fact.



	68) There is not very much point in whining about an Amended

	Complaint that does not yet, per se, exist.



	D.

	69) Contrary to Defendants' explicit assertion, Plaintiffs have not


                                       - 15 -







	"filed" an Amended Complaint; they have "submitted" a "Proposed

	Amended Complaint".  Words do have meanings, a point which

	Defendants seem to have forgotten frequently.



	70) The necessity of a "continuance" is as follows: should the

	Court decide today, Plaintiffs would not, together, be in

	sufficiently good health to then attend to the consequent

	necessities.  How long the District Court will deliberate

	in its de novo review is unknown to Plaintiffs.



	71) Plaintiffs are in fragile conditions that are ultimately

	the result of Defendants' actions.



	72) What would be an appropriate consideration by the Court

	should a plague descend upon an attorney's office?  Should

	represented Plaintiffs be caused to suffer?  The analogies

	and metaphors are clear.



	73) Plaintiff Bellamente's spinal surgery did not go as smoothly

	as was expected and his prognosis is uncertain.  If for some

	reason this procedure fails, a fusion at L1-L2 will become

	necessary, a forth surgical intervention that would require

	a longer period of convalescence.  Moreover, he is currently be

	treated for a respiratory infection apparently contracted while

	in hospital for surgery.  This is on advice of physicians.

	The Court is at least now on sufficient notice that Plaintiffs'

	enhanced and indeterminate disabilities exist.





                                       - 16 -










	                          CONCLUSIONS



	74) A legitimate opposition by rule, statute and precedent is to be

	expected from Defendants.  A pseudo-opposition, engineered through

	trickery, deceptions, innuendoes and games of ignoration is improper

	and not legitimate.  Unwarranted game-playing, ad hominem and vague

	attacks on Plaintiffs' purported "misapprehensions" are improper

	responses to Plaintiffs' careful applications of existing law,

	contrasted with Plaintiffs' careful analysis of Defendants'

	misapplications and ignorations of existing law, as well as

	ignoration of Plaintiffs' very allegations.



	75) The continued misapplication by Defendants of binding precedent

	and spurious applications of non-binding decisions are also,

	in themselves, improper as attempts to confuse issues before

	this Court. Cf. (#37 pp. 5, 7)



	76) Defendants' oppositions are frivolous, arrogantly insulting

	and harassing to Plaintiffs, causing them repeatedly to be burdened

	themselves and to burden the Court with overly long analytical

	pleadings such as this memorandum.



	77) It is ridiculous that Plaintiffs should have to endure this

	continuing "ostrich gambit" from Defendants.



	78) This Response of Defendants to Plaintiffs' Objections is completely

	typical of all Defendants' oppositions to Plaintiffs litigation.


                                       - 17 -







	Plaintiffs, not defendants, are the ones who have actually

	"bushwhacked through a thicket" of ill conceived pleadings by

	Defendants in search of one legitimate opposition.

	Cf., e.g., (# 37, p. 7); as Diogenes Laertius, they have failed

	in their quest.



	79) For Plaintiffs to be dismised, with prejudice, in this matter is

	clearly inappropriate, in view of procedurally improper actions

	of the magistrate, and the clear chicanery of Defendants.  



	80) THEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray the Court to consider the Response

	of Defendants for exactly what it is: an exercise in the

	improper practice of law.


	Respectfully submitted,


        This 16th day of May, 2000


        William C. Hammel                     Alan J. Bellamente
        A-11 Moose Branch Road,               A-11 Moose Branch Road,
	Sweetwater Apartments 1A,             Sweetwater Apartments 8A,
        Robbinsville, NC 28771                Robbinsville, NC 28771
        (828) 479-1547                        (828) 479-1547



        -------------------------------      ------------------------------
        William C. Hammel                     Alan J. Bellamente















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