UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURT
    DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

JUDY E. MORRIS, MD   )
      )
   Plaintiff  ) Civil Action No. CA 98-30204 FHF
      )
v.      )
      )
UNUM CORPORATION OF AMERICA,  )
 et al.    )
   Defendants


   PLAINTIFF JUDY MORRIS, MD's MOTION
   TO DISQUALIFY OPPOSING COUNSEL PATRICIA
   A. PEARD

This motion is submitted and plaintiff desires it to be noted for the
record for purposes of appeal if necessary.  Plaintiff, Judy E. Morris,
M.D. asks the court to disqualify opposing counsel, Patricia A. Peard
from further representation of "UNUM"
Defendants, officers, employees, subcontractors and others.

CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1(a)(2)
Plaintiff, Judy Morris, MD, having made several other fruitless attempts
to have any conferences with UNUM and Patricia Peard since approximately
March 1997, gave the following Notice, in lieu of an attempt to confer,
prior to filing this Motion to Disqualify Opposing Counsel and the
accompanying Motion to Show Cause why UNUM should not be enjoined from
continued Breach of Contract in this case.
Plaintiff called Ms. Peard's office at 10:10 am on January 28, 1999.
Ms. Peard was unavailable so plaintiff left a message on her voicemail.
This message was witnessed by Linda Stacy Duclos, who was listening on
the extension.  See attachments.

A. Introduction
1. Plaintiff sued UNUM Corporation and multiple employees, officers,
subcontractors and others for Racketeering under 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968,
and multiple state causes of actions relating to egregious Breach of
Contracts.
2.  Plaintiff asks the court to disqualify opposing counsel from further
representation of "UNUM" because she has engaged in intentional
misrepresentations to the court and refused to deal in good faith with
the plaintiff as required by the Local Rules of the Court.
B. Argument & Authorities
3.  Plaintiff contends that Ms. Peard, an interloper in this court's
jurisdiction, an individual who had to obtain this Honorable Court's
permission to defend her clients in this District immediately set out on
a course of action that is in conflict with the Local Rules of the
Court, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, her sworn oath of office as
an officer of the Court and has conducted herself in such a manner as to
maliciously mislead this Honorable Court and to attempt to deny
plaintiff of her legal and Constitutional rights to be heard.  Ms.
Peard's arguments and actions actions are prejudicial and designed to
prejudice the Court against the plaintiff.

4. Plaintiff states the following reasons to substantiate her
allegations:

    On page 3 of Ms. Peard's Motion to Dismiss she states: "Morris is a
pro se litigant, but this does not mean that she is entitled to file
pleadings which are impermissible under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."  While this statement has some merit, it is also knowingly
misleading and intentionally designed to materially mislead and deceive
this Honorable Court.  Had Ms. Peard taken the time to read the very
case law that she has used to substantiate her allegations she would
have come to the conclusion that a far more appropriate motion would
have been to seek relief under FRCP 12(e) Motion for More Definite
Statement. "Pleadings of a Pro Se litigant must be construed liberally."
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519(1972); Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605 (2d
Cir. 1990).
     By way of illustration, two of the cases that Ms. Peard cited to
justify her allegations against plaintiff are, Martin v Hunt, 28 F.D.R.
35, 36 (D. Ma 1961) and Green v Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 108
F.D.R. 217, 218 (D. Ma. 1985).  While it is true that the Court
dismissed the cases for the reasons that Ms. Peard states, what Ms.
Peard conveniently fails to bring to this Court's attention is that in
Martin v Hunt the Court also stated: "The petitioner is granted leave to
file an amended complaint complying with the requirements of Rule 8 and
setting forth a short, concise, and plain statement of his claim against
the respondent Francis J. Hunt, within thirty days from the date
hereof."  Similarly in Green v Commonwealth, the Court stated: "The
controlling rule requires a short, plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief."  Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2)
Further, "Accordingly, this case is dismissed and Green is afforded 30
days from the date of this order to move for leave to file an amended
complaint which comports with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."  By
failing to bring to this Court's attention that in two of the cases
cited by Ms. Peard, plaintiff was allowed to amend their complaints, she
has knowingly and maliciously attempted to deceive this court into
believing these two complaints were dismissed without leave to amend.
    Additionally, Ms. Peard's viciousness and contempt for plaintiff and
her contempt for this Court extends to failing to bring to this Court's
attention Foman v Davis, 371, U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962) in
which the court states: "If the underlying facts or circumstances relied
upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be
afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits."  Worst of all
Ms. Peard's ignorance of Mullane v Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Company, 339, U.S. (1950) in which the Court ruled "Against the interest
of the State we must balance the individual interest sought to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  This is defined by our holding
that 'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard.'"
    Ms. Peard's conduct is shameless.  It is designed to not only
knowingly deny plaintiff of all of her rights under the law, including
her Constitutional rights but extend to knowingly, unconscionably and
with complete malice aforethought, maliciously mislead this Honorable
Court.

2.  Ms. Peard implies that because plaintiff is a pro se litigant that
plaintiff is therefore acting irresponsibly is a ploy that could not be
used if plaintiff was represented by counsel.  It is also a ploy
intended to impugn plaintiff's integrity.  Ms. Peard paints plaintiff as
an unintelligent, vindictive bitch.  Plaintiff, Dr. Morris, would like
to remind this Court that she is a medical doctor, a respected member of
her community, and her allegations have been extensively documented with
appropriate legal citations.
3. Counsel is also breaching her obligations in accordance with the
legal code of ethics.  One quote from the Massachusetts Rules of
Professional Conduct 1998 edition should suffice to make the point.  "A
lawyer does not violate this rule, however, by acceding to reasonable
requests of opposing counsel which does not prejudice the rights of his
or her client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional
comments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy
and consideration all persons involved in the legal process."  (emphasis
added)
     Ms. Peard has done this by the tactics mentioned above.  She has
also proven this with regard to her violating plaintiff's rights when
she violated her obligations under the Local Rule 7.1(a)(2), by filing
motions without first conferring with plaintiff in good faith prior to
filing motions.   Claiming to leave a message on Plaintiff's answering
machine (when no message was in fact left), and then filing a motion 5
days later, hardly constitutes any attempt, Good Faith or otherwise, to
confer.  When plaintiff requested, in writing, for Mr. Peard to call her
to confer about an impending motion, Ms. Peard responded by letter,
attacking the plaintiff and setting up an impossible task, stating it
was plaintiff's burden to attempt to confer, not Ms. Peard's.  However
if Ms. Peard refuses to call plaintiff when plaintiff attempts a
conference, how can plaintiff possibly confer?  When an attorney does as
Ms. Peard is doing and fails to meet her obligations to plaintiff and
the legal system, as required by the rules, than as indicated in Rule
11(b)(1) and 26(c) "justice requires to protect a party from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense"
     While Counsel is obligated to put forth the best possible defense
for her client that she is capable of putting forth, this obligations
does not absolve her from following the Local Rules of the Court, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor to breach her obligations under
the lawyers code of ethics, nor her sworn oath as an Officer of the
Court.  In fact as a sworn Officer of the Court she is to be held to a
much higher standard than a pro se litigant.
4.  Ms. Peard, in her zeal to defend her clients to the best of her
ability, has forgotten that by law she is obligated to deal with
plaintiff in "Good Faith."  Part of the definition of good faith
according to Black's Law Dictionary is "Good faith is an intangible and
abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and
it encompasses, among other thinks, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek unconscionable
advantage" An honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law
(emphasis added).  Similarly a partial definition of Bad Faith according
to Black's Law Dictionary is "The opposite of 'good faith'. The term 'bad
faith' is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies
conscious doing of wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity.  Ms. Peard told Plaintiff repeatedly during their first
telephone conversation on November 24, 1998, which she refused to allow
plaintiff to tape record, that she was going to deal with plaintiff in
Good Faith.
5.  In her zeal to defend her clients, Ms. Peard has chosen to indicate
that plaintiff's complaint is full of diatribes and scandalous
statements.  Both allegations are misleading, deceptive and a clear
indication that counsel will stoop to any level, will do anything, fair
or foul, to have this valid complaint dismissed; even if these actions
violate plaintiff's right of Due Process "to be heard."  Ms. Peard is
doing this even though it will put her in the position where she will
knowingly violate her code of legal ethics and her oath as a sworn
officer of the court.
     With regard to the slanderous allegations contained in this
complaint, Ms. Peard is referring to plaintiff's RICO allegations.
Plaintiff would like to remind this honorable Court and counsel that all
that is required of her at this point in time is to have more than a
scintilla of evidence to substantiate her allegations.  Plaintiff
clearly meets this burden of proof at this time and plaintiff expects to
be in a position to prove her RICO allegations beyond any doubt, much
less a preponderance of the evidence, when she is permitted the
opportunity to avail herself of the discovery process and present her
evidence and witnesses at trial.  In Atchison v. District of Columbia,
73 F.3d 418, 421-22 (D.C.Dir. 1996) the Court ruled, "A plaintiff...need
not allege all that a plaintiff must eventually prove."
6.  With regard to diatribes, plaintiff can only assume that counsel's
logic is flawed as it is with regard to plaintiff's RICO allegations.
In any event it is up to counsel to request any clarification she
requires should she fail to understand the complaint.  Plaintiff is not
a mind reader and therefore cannot be expected to assume that counsel
understands the nature of the complaint.  UNUM, and their counsel have
unilaterally cancelled one conference, and in Bad Faith, failed to make
reasonable attempts to confer or answer plaintiff's request to confer.
    Counsel as a sworn officer of the court is obligated to be far more
familiar with the FRCP to seek the appropriate redress as opposed to
moving to dismiss an otherwise valid complaint.  IN Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230(1962) the Court states, "If the
underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a
proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test
his claim on the merits."  This Court's decision is completely
consistent with the Court's decision in Mullane sited above.
     Counsel fails to accept the fact that while she has an obligation
to her clients, she also has an obligation of fidelity to the law, the
American Judicial system as well.  Justice at any price is not justice
at all.  To knowingly and intentionally breach her sworn oath as an
Officer of the Court is for counsel to impugn her own integrity.
    7.  Plaintiff is well aware of the fact that most courts are
reluctant to dismiss an attorney from a case.  At the same time
plaintiff would like to remind the court that it was at this Court's
discretion to grant Ms. Peard standing and that the Court has the
discretion to withdraw that permission.  At the very least plaintiff
prays that this honorable court will advise her that this Court will not
permit Ms. Peard to run amok of the judicial system.  Plaintiff prays
this Court will advise Ms. Peard that this Court will not tolerate such
unconscionable and materially misleading behavior, that this Court will
not permit Ms. Peard to violate all of plaintiff's legal and
Constitutional rights with impunity and that this Court will hold
counsel to the high standard that the American People have become
accustomed to.
   8. By plaintiff's knowledge and belief of the tactics of UNUM Defense
attorneys and the preliminary efforts of Ms. Peard, if Ms. Peard is
allowed to remain on this case, both plaintiff and the Court can expect
an ongoing series of lies, deceptions and unethical attempts to mislead
the court, delay hearings, and defame the plaintiff.  Ms. Peard has
become a party to UNUM's extortion by agreeing to represent them in
their indefensible stance that plaintiff has not proven what they refuse
to tell her how she can prove but what is obvious to everyone else
involved.   UNUM has refused to confer in Good Faith with plaintiff for
over a year and a half.  Ms. Peard is continuing to refuse to confer.
UNUM's plan will be to trifurcate the proceeding and then suddenly agree
to pay plaintiff's benefits shortly before the trial on the benefits in
order to deprive the Court of issuing a verdict against them.  Meanwhile
during the months to years it takes to get to this point, they hope the
plaintiff will be forced by financial, emotional or physical exhaustion
and duress to give up.  As per UNUM's Modus Operandi, any adverse
decision will be appealed.  Again, consistently UNUM and Ms. Peard will
engage in continuous and ongoing egregious Bad Faith as defined by
Black's Law Dictionary.
    Ms. Peard has already on several occasions proven herself deceitful
and unethical.  Justice will not be served by allowing her continued
presence in this case.
9. Attachments:
A-1.  Letter from UNUM Counsel Ann Courtney, dated November 16, 1999,
canceling previously scheduled conference
A-2.  Ms. Peard's sworn statement that she is familiar with the Local
Rules of this Court.
A-3.  Notes from telephone conversation November 24, 1998 between
Plaintiff and Ms. Peard.  Mr. Jack Artale, listening on the extension,
also wrote his notes which are included.
A-4.  Page from Plaintiff Opposition to UNUM Motion to Dismiss
describing how Ms. Peard "faked" a phone call to attempt to confer prior
to filing her Motion to Dismiss.
A-5.  Letter from Plaintiff to Ms. Peard, dated January 2, 1999,
requesting an attempt to confer about a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.
A-6.  Ms. Peard's response to plaintiff's request, dated Jan 6, 1999.
A-7.  Phone call "Notice" of plaintiff's intention to file this and
accompanying Motion for Order to Show Cause.
10. Signed under the penalties of perjury this 28th day of January,
1999.
Judy E. Morris, MD
       PRO SE


      CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true copy of the above document was
delivered in person January 29th, 1999 to US District Court, District
of Massachusetts, Springfield and served by United States Postal Mail,
postage prepaid upon the following attorneys representing all defendants
in Morris v. UNUM, et al. Mailed on January 29th, 1999.



       Judy E. Morris, MD
       PRO SE

Patricia A. Peard, Esq.   representing "UNUM" Katherine A. Robertson,
Esq.    "UNUM's" local counsel
William J. Kayatta, Esq.   representing Robert Crispin
H. Gregory Williams    representing State of Mass.,
     Harshbarger, Melconian, DOI,
  Ruthardt, Goetz, Marcinkus,
   Marquez
Tracy L. Devlin, Esq.   representing IFB and Michael
E. Michael Sloman, Esq.   Gray
Thomas H. Hayman, Esq.   representing Betty Rae Poppo
Robert Pierce, Esq.    representing Harrington and
   Mangion
Christopher N. Jones   Co-Counsel for Transunion
Carolyn G. Sullivan    representing Jack Taylor



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Created: February 3, 1999


Last Updated: May 28, 2000