Subject: Opposition to Insurance Fraud Bureau Motion to Dismiss


   Plaintiff  ) Civil Action No. CA 98-30204 FHF
v.      )
 et al.    )


I, Judy E. Morris, MD, being a citizen of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, under pains and penalties of perjury do hereby
strongly oppose the motion put forth to dismiss the above complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P, Rule 8 and Fed. R. Civ. P, Rule 12(b)(6) and
jurisdictional questions and other defenses as filed by E. Michael
Sloman, counsel for the ^”IFB Defendants.
   1. Plaintiff restates and incorporates as if set here in full
arguments opposing Motions to Dismiss submitted by attorneys
representing Betty Rae Poppo, ^”UNUM,^‘ and Robert Crispin that have been
previously or simultaneously filed with the courts and all attorneys.
Plaintiff also restates and incorporates the previously submitted
Statement of Claim, Entitlement to Relief and RICO Statement.

    2. Local Rules of Court 7.1(a)(2) requires the Court Clerk to strike
any pleadings or motions not accompanied by certification of personal
consultation. (Exhibit A).  Plaintiff states under pains and penalties
of perjury that she never received any message or is aware of any
attempt of counsel for the IFB to contact her to confer about this
motion to dismiss.  Nor did Attorney Sloman submit the required
^”certification of personal consultation.^‘  If, as Mr. Sloman desires, we
are to strictly interpret the Court rules without any leeway on the
merits of the complaint, common sense or consideration of circumstances,
or the requirements of Rule 8 ^”to do substantial justice^‘ his motion
must be stricken automatically and not considered at all.
   3. However, if plaintiff will be given similar latitude in the
interests of justice, the merits of her claims, and allowed to flesh out
her claims against the Insurance Fraud Bureau, she may be willing to
overlook this blatant lack of consideration of the Local Rules of the
Federal Courts of Massachusetts by Attorney Sloman.
   4.  As to the argument that plaintiff^“s pleading is not short and
concise, this has been opposed several times in the previous oppositions
to motions to dismiss. Furthermore, the main gist of Attorney Sloman^“s
request for dismissal of his clients is that plaintiff did not plead
with enough particularity the allegations against them.  Mr. Sloman
seems to understand very well that plaintiff is arguing that his clients
had a duty to act to investigate the fraud and racketeering complaints
alleged by plaintiff but failed to.  Pleading with particularity against
each of 60 defendants would have unnecessarily lengthened this complaint
immensely.  On Page 3 of Attorney Sloman^“s motion he complains that
plaintiff^“s complaint contains ^”an abundance of facts.^‘  An ^”abundance
of facts^‘ in a complaint would seem to be a positive feature if it is
indeed the Court^“s interest to ^”do substantial justice.^‘ Fed. Rul. Civ.
P. 8(f) and Rule 1.
   5.  At this point, plaintiff is requesting some latitude.  She avers
that failure to act to prevent the crimes of fraud, racketeering and
extortion, when one is duty bound to do so, confers a degree of
culpability on the non-reactors for the crimes committed.  Due to lack
of time and resources, plaintiff
may not be able to cite legal precedents within the time frame required
to respond to this Motion to Dismiss.  The basis of this culpability
resides in the deceitful nature of the Insurance Fraud Bureau who holds
themselves out to the public as an agency that investigates insurance
fraud, and yet, hides and conceals the fact that they are not a
government agency and will not investigate crimes committed by insurance
companies, even though they will investigate the exact same crimes if
committed against insurance companies. Commonwealth v. Ellis, Indictment
No^“s. 97-0192 (1-28), 97-0565 (1-14).
   In this way their deceptive lack of action does affect commerce by
allowing fraud, racketeering and extortion to occur, and deceiving the
Factual Data:
    On September 10, 1997, plaintiff visited the Boston office of the
Insurance Fraud Bureau. She told Mr. Michael Gray, who gave her his
business card, Attachment B, the details of fraud and extortion against
her and other claimants being perpetrated by UNUM Insurance Company and
that the evidence was contained in notebooks she had left for Mr. Combs,
another employee of the IFB.  Mr. Gray did not dispute that plaintiff
might have valid complaints but told her he couldn^“t do anything about
it but refused to say why.  He did not inform her, nor is it evident
anywhere on his business card that the reason his office could not or
would not do anything is because it is not a government regulatory
agency as plaintiff believed but basically a Private Investigation
agency paid for by insurance companies, as Plaintiff found out much
later, on her own.
    Plaintiff also had several conversations with Steve Combs, left two
notebooks full of evidence for him, and wrote and spoke with him briefly
several more times.  At no time did Mr. Combs inform plaintiff that the
IFB is a private agency and not a government agency, a fact that would
have very easily cleared up the confusion in the plaintiff^“s mind as to
why an organization that holds itself out to the public as the
Massachusetts Insurance Fraud Bureau seemed to have absolutely no
interest in investigating insurance fraud which is perpetrated by and
insurance company.
   Apparently neither Mr. Gray nor Mr. Combs communicated any of
these conversations to their superiors as evidenced from the telephone
conversation plaintiff had with Dan Skelly, the Chief of the IFB.  On
October 28, 1998, shortly after plaintiff had filed suit and named the
IFB and Michael Gray as a defendant, she received a telephone call from
Mr. Skelly.  Mr. Skelly was responding to a letter written to him by
Plaintiff^“s State Senator Stephen Brewer who also apparently thought the
Insurance Fraud Bureau investigated complaints about insurance fraud.
Attachment C.
   Mr. Skelly agreed to allow plaintiff to tape record this
conversation, a transcript of which is included as Attachment D.
(The tape is available upon request.) In this conversation plaintiff
asks Mr. Skelly what is the definition of fraud.
His response ^”A Deliberate Deception.^‘
   Further in the conversation Mr. Skelly is heard deliberately
attempting to evade plaintiff^“s inquiry as to the public vs. private
nature of the Insurance Fraud Bureau.  In this conversation, Mr. Skelly
specifically states that the IFB does not use ^”private^‘ investigators,
knowing all along that his entire organization is in fact private, and
therefore the investigators they use to videotape claimants suspected of
insurance fraud would be private investigators.
   Mr. Skelly never states that his agency will not investigate
plaintiff^“s allegations because they are against an insurance company
and his agency is a private agency paid for by insurance companies.
Eventually, upon persistent questioning from plaintiff, he admitted the
source of his agency^“s funding.
   This was actually the first time plaintiff was told of the
possibility that the Massachusetts Insurance Fraud Bureau was not a
government agency, and only because she specifically asked Mr. Skelly
for the source of the funds of the IFB.
   If, as plaintiff suspects, there is a collusive relationship between
the Attorney General^“s office, the IFB, and insurance company interests,
then this phone call and the deceptions therein qualify as the predicate
act of wire fraud.
   Around this time, after her lawsuit was filed in Federal Court in
Springfield, plaintiff also found a brief filed in the case of the
Commonwealth v James N. Ellis, Jr.  Indictment No^“s. 97-0192 (1-28),
97-0565 (1-14) which tells in graphic detail the nature of the collusive
relationship between the privately funded Massachusetts Insurance Fraud
Bureau and the Massachusetts Attorney General^“s Office, that reeks of
corporate bribery, the tainting of public officials prosecutorial
discretion, and the use of public officers for private justice.
Attachment E.
   According to this document, the use and promotion by the State of
Massachusetts of a Private Investigative Agency which pays the salaries
of thirteen designated ^”assistant attorney generals^‘ required to ^”devote
full-time to the investigation and prosecution of^Ňinsurance fraud
matters^Ňreferred by [the] insurance fraud bureau^‘ is unprecedented in
the United States and plaintiff would have had no reason to know, unless
she was told that this was not in fact, a government agency.
(Page 3 of Attachment E)
   This document alludes to accountability ^”of the Attorney General (in
his own word) to the IFB.^‘ (Page 4 of Attachment E).
   As this document says ^”The inexorable result of the ^—special public
private partnership^“ with its features of ^—access and accountability^“,
is that, by and large, the priorities of the IFB have become those of
the AG.  Thus, for example, the focus of the IFB only on fraud committed
against its own members is mirrored in the policy of the AGIFD [Attorney
General Insurance Fraud Division.]^Ň..  This is clearly demonstrated by
the Attorney General^“s refusal to even investigate a pattern of
fraudulent behavior designed to deny workers^“ legitimate claims
committed by certain insurance company consultants and well documented
in a report prepared by the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys.
   Plaintiff Morris is working on getting a copy of this report  and/or
the brief prepared for this case by Kathleen O^“Donnell, Former President
of the Massachusetts Trial Lawyers Association regarding her efforts to
get the Attorney General^“s office to investigate and prosecute alleged
abuses by insurance companies and their consultants for purposes of
depriving injured workers of legitimate benefits.
  Plaintiff is at a disadvantage over the law firms representing the
defendants in that she does not have immediate access to on line legal
services, nor staff to do legal research for her.
5.  Along that same lines, plaintiff has seen legal theories of
responsibility of agencies for crimes they fail to prevent and will, if
given the opportunity, flesh this out with law and precedent in the
future.  This would include responsibility for allowing racketeering,
extortion, mail and wire fraud, once adequately informed of such and
given enough time to act.  The Insurance Fraud Bureau had ample
evidence, a cooperative complainant, and plenty of time, to act to
prevent the future perpetration of these crimes by UNUM.

   Based on these facts and theories and Attachments B, C, D and E,
plaintiff avers that she has presented enough evidence to oppose a
motion to dismiss the Insurance Fraud Bureau and Michael Gray as
defendants in this case for failure to state a claim against them under
RICO.  Furthermore she is certain that documents are discoverable that
will confirm predicate acts such as bribery which will conclusively show
that the Insurance Fraud Bureau is engaging in conduct meant to
undermine the Attorney General^“s ability and willingness to investigate
and prosecute crimes by insurance companies thereby obstructing the
ability of private citizens to obtain justice when wronged by insurance
companies, such as plaintiff was. All these are Predicate Acts under
RICO 18 USC 1961-1968.  Furthermore, it was not the intention of the
authors of RICO, that each and every member of a racketeering enterprise
have personally engaged in 2 Predicate acts, only that the enterprise
and the individuals in it, conducted a series of predicate acts.
    Plaintiff included the IFB and the Government agency defendants for
the express reason that, if not for the failure of these appropriate
agencies to investigate, report and remedy the racketeering acts
alleged, they would not be occurring.
    US Code Title 18, Section 201 states that it is a RICO Predicate Act
for (b) ^”Whoever ^÷
directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any public official or person who has been selected to be a
public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person
who has been selected to be a public official^Ň^Ň^Ň with intent-
   (A) to influence any official act, or
   (B) to influence such public official or person who has been selected
to be public official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or
allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud,
on the United States, or
   (C) to induce such public official or such person who has been
selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official or person^‘
   What good are laws if the agencies responsible for enforcement refuse
to enforce or selectively enforce only on the part of private interests?

   By means of the collusive relationship, as detailed in Document E
between the Attorney General^“s office and the Insurance Fraud Bureau,
the Attorney General has been improperly influenced to not investigate
crimes committed by insurance companies against the citizens of the
   The Insurance Fraud Bureau provides the District Attorneys office
with over $1 Million dollars per year and the prestige of claiming they
are fighting crime.

   Plaintiff contends this provides ample evidence of probable RICO
violations of the Insurance Fraud Bureau to generally or specifically
deter the Attorney General^“s office from investigating consumer
complaints against insurance companies.
Particularities will undoubtedly be found through discovery motions,
interrogatories, requests for admissions and further investigation if
this case against the IFB is allowed to go forward.
    The abrogation of the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney
General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by Private interests has
tremendous public policy implications.  The discovery of the
relationship between the IFB and AG certainly sheds a great deal of
light on the reasons why the plaintiff received continual brush-offs
from the Attorney General^“s office despite providing them with ample
evidence of a criminally fraudulent conspiracy by UNUM Insurance Company
that is a danger to the citizens of the Commonwealth. See Attachments F
and G for the most recent ^”brush-offs^‘ from the Attorney General^“s
   6. As to the jurisdictional elements of this case.  At the time
plaintiff filed this case in Federal Court, she was still under the
impression that the Insurance Fraud Bureau was a government agency and
therefore the Springfield Federal Court would have jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in their continuing deception as to the true nature of the
IFB, when asked if the IFB was a division of the Attorney General^“s
office, a public division, Mr. Skelly replied in the phone conversation
with plaintiff ^”Mmmm, well it^“s created by legislation, privately
funded.^‘  As previously stated because this is a unique relationship the
nature of the IFB, and it^“s attempt to appear as a government agency to
the public, would make it at the very least quasi-governmental and
subject to laws regulating lawsuits against state government and
therefore it this judicial jurisdiction.  In fact Mr. Sloman even refers
to the IFB as a State Agency in his motion, Page 1.
  7.  Plaintiff has clearly defeated plaintiff^“s Motion to Dismiss the
IFB on three grounds:
   (a) failure to comply with the rule of certification of personal
   (b) evidence that this agency might in fact be corruptly influencing
public officials and engaging in deception by use of the telephone, both
RICO violations, and
   (C) their intention to deceive both the plaintiff and the public into
thinking they are an investigative division of the State Attorney
General^“s office when they are really nothing more than a glorified
Private Investigation Agency with special access to the Attorney
Generals prosecutorial powers and the ability to influence his office
not to investigate crimes by insurers. Plaintiff has in her complaint
and herein alleged facts to support the essential elements of her
claims.  Case law states that the standard on an FRCP 12(b)(6) motion is
so stringent that a court will rarely encounter circumstances that
justify granting such a motion. Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d
921, 926 (5th Cir. 1988).
  8.  Conclusions:  For all the above reasons plaintiff maintains she
has satisfied the burden of stating a claim against the IFB and Michael
Gray.  Furthermore, as other defendants^“ attorneys are doing, Attorney
Slocum made no effort in good faith or otherwise to follow the court
rules requiring litigants to confer to resolve or narrow the issues.
The plaintiff requests that the court start considering sanctions
against attorneys who refuse to follow the simple procedures set out in
the Local Rules while invoking these same rules whenever it suits their
    as per Local Rule 7.1(D)
Plaintiff again reiterates her request for oral arguments and a
conference with the judge as soon as possible. To avoid the necessity of
filing and responding to multiple frivolous and meritless motions of
this type, plaintiff,  respectfully requests a meeting of counsel
representing all defendants and the plaintiff with a court officer or
judge at the earliest possible time to establish the ground rules for
this litigation including the requirement of all parties to avoid filing
unnecessary motions, incurring unnecessary costs and delays, and to
establish appropriate penalties and sanctions for parties that do not
abide by the rules set up by this court.
Plaintiff also feels obligated to advise the court that based on her
observation and belief, as stated with particularity in her complaint,
she is engaged in a hostile negotiation, and it is unlikely any true
justice will be achieved outside of a Court of Law.  With this in mind,
plaintiff requests an early trial date, admonitions and strict
guidelines for both sides to comply with discovery, and penalties and
sanctions set up for parties that do not comply.
Signed under the penalties of perjury this 4th day of January, 1999.

Judy E. Morris, MD
       PRO SE

    I hereby certify that a true copy of the above document was
delivered in person January 4th, 1999 to US District Court, District of
Massachusetts, Springfield and served by United States Postal Mail,
postage prepaid upon the following attorneys representing all defendants
in Morris v. UNUM, et al. Mailed on January 4th, 1999.

       Judy E. Morris, MD
       PRO SE

Patricia A. Peard, Esq.    representing ^”UNUM^‘ claimants
Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer
& Nelson, PA
100 Middle Street, PO Box 9729
Portland, ME  04104-5209

Katherine A. Robertson, Esq.   ^”UNUM^“s^‘ local counsel
Buckley, Richardson & Gelinas
1500 Main Street
PO box 15507
Springfield, MA  01115

William J. Kayatta, Esq.   representing Robert Crispin
Geraldine G. Sanchez, Esq.
Pierce Atwood
One Monument Square
Portland, ME 04101

H. Gregory Williams    representing State of Mass.,
Assistant AG     Harshbarger, Melconian, DOI,
Office of Attorney General  Ruthardt, Goetz, Marcinkus,
Western Mass. Division   Marquez
436 Dwight Street
Springfield, MA 01103-1317

Tracy L. Devlin, Esq.   representing IFB and Michael
E. Michael Sloman, Esq.    Gray
Meyer, Connolly, Sloman
& MacDonald, LLP
12 Post Office Square
Boston, MA  02109

Thomas H. Hayman, Esq.   representing Betty Rae Poppo
Cetrulo & Capone, LLP
53 State Street
Exchange Place
Boston, MA  02109

Robert Pierce, Esq.
Gretchen A. Brodnicki, Esq.  representing Harrington and
Pierce & Mandell, PC   Mangion
11 Beacon Street, Suite 800
Boston, MA  02108-3002

Christopher N. Jones   Co-Counsel for Transunion
Marion, Satzberg, Trichon,   Credit Corporation with Pat
Kogan & Wertheimer, PC   Peard
3000 Mellon Bank Center
1735 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA  19103-7640

Carolyn G. Sullivan    representing Jack Taylor
Melick & Porter, LLP
28 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts  02109

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Created: January 6, 1999
Last Updated: May 28, 2000