The Progress of this case will be followed from a


in chronological order with links to appropriate documents.


             WILLIAM C. HAMMEL,                    |
             ALAN J. BELLAMENTE,                   |
             et al.,                               |      
                  Plaintiff Appellants             |      
                   vs.                             |
                                                   |    MEMORANDUM  
             INSURANCE CO.,                        |    INFORMAL BRIEF
             STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANY,         |
             et al.                                |    No. 00-2369
                  Defendant Appellees              |

	                      Opening Remarks

	In its memorandum and order of dismissal, the district court

	does not make clear exactly what it considers res judicata

	upon which its dismissal is based: whether it is the order of
	the New Jersey Court dismissing Bad Faith claims assuming that
	to be our only substantive claim; or the PIP settlement,
	assuming that we are reasserting claims already properly
	adjudicated; or that our current claims would be barred by New
	Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, because we "could have
	presented this claim [RICO] in the state court action.",

	or any combination of the foregoing.

	We must then address facts and law for each situation.

	We contend that through our pleadings we have alleged

	that the very settlements with Indemnity are nothing but


	instruments of the racketeering, trickery and deceit by

	Mutual through Indemnity its attorneys and IME physician,

	and that the litigation in case I was therefore flawed.

                                  Issue #1

        Whether the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff-

	Appellants' suit, first, as res judicata, and second

	under New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine.

                         Supporting Facts and Argument


	Both res judicata and entire controversy bar relitigation

	in a subsequent suit with the same cause of action derived

	from the same set of facts against the same parties.  However,

	this suit is parallel and not subsequent, based on a different

	set of facts unknown during the first case and against

	additional parties.  The claims against defendants do not

	derive from the facts of the first case.


	We originally filed our RICO action after having read the

	opinions and findings of the court in the [Campbell] case.

	Having compared the surface details of our experiences with the

	court's findings and after having e-mail correspondence with

	others who had suffered similarly at the hands of State Farm,

	we were confident that discovery would provide the internal

	details of how and why we were treated as we were.


	Though we thought the RICO action to be ripe at the time of

	submission and at the time of filing, as events proved, only

	during December, 1999 through February 2000 did a great

	number of evidential details come to light from the discovery

	material of case I.

	Though we filed case II before case I had terminated in

	settlement, August 6, 1999, not in June, as Ms. Wall has

	stated, Affidavit & Exhibits [Record: vol. 1-2, #19]. The

	detailed evidence of criminal activities that we had not even

	suspected, only became known to us in and after December 1999.

	At the time of submitting the original complaint in case II,

	we were residents of North Carolina, where further actionable

	conspiracies and deeds were committed.  We saw that neither the

	state court of New Jersey nor that of North Carolina would have

	proper jurisdiction, and that only the federal court would.

	The court in case I, was not a competent court of jurisdiction

	to hear the issues of federal RICO presented in case II.

	[Watkins 51 52]

	The current case (II) is not a successive suit and therefore

	the entire controversy doctrine does not apply.  We used all

	due diligence in exploring our suspicions before filing II;

	the signatures on the original complaint are March 11, 1999.

	Filing date is indicated by the district court's docket is

	March 12, 1999.  This is before the first overture of

	settlement by Indemnity.  See also [Record: vol. 4, #45. p. 4].


	Res judicata should not be applied since we were not aware,

	and could not have been aware of the facts upon which the

	current claims are based.  Our attorneys in case I were

	denied their discovery demands through trickery and delays.

	On their arrival for depositions of Indemnity's employees,

	they were given access to a stack of documents over one

	foot high, which was the demanded discovery material.

	Fifteen days after depositions of Indemnity's employees,

	the documents required for discovery were finally

	delivered to them.

	We and our attorneys were clearly and deliberately put in the

	position, through delays and trickery, of not being able to

	fully litigate our claims, even then.

	     Regarding both res judicata and "entire controversy"

	Case I arose out of the agreement/contract of an insurance

	policy and the relationship between us as the insureds

	of defendant Indemnity, and a set of facts which are mere

	background of Case II.  The essential fact was that Indemnity

	failed in its performance.

	The claims of Case I were brought solely under the insurance

	law of the State of New Jersey to force Indemnity's performance

	and solely in the matter of first party PIP under New Jersey's

	no-fault system.  Our PIP coverage is, to date, not exhausted.


	Case II arose out of the criminal conduct of the defendants

	Indemnity, Mutual, Melli, and Fremed, in consort, during the

	litigation process in Case I, and upon the criminal conduct of

	defendants Indemnity, Mutual, Melli, and Fremed, that was

	unknown, and unsuspected in its details, by us until and after

	December 1999.  The relationship between us and Indemnity is of

	a totally different character than in case I; our relationships

	with other defendants in case II were nonexistent in case I.

        One set of facts upon which our claims are based postdate the

	settlement of litigation; while a second set of facts was

	unknown to us until and after December, 1999, some of which

	predate and some of which postdate the termination of

	litigation in New Jersey.

	The claims of Case II do not arise from an insurance policy:

	Response: [Record: vol. 1-2, #28]; the substance of our

	proposed amended complaint; Objections: [Record: vol. 4, #46,

	pp. 6-7, parag. 20].

	A single act of bad faith is just that; levels of schemes that

	we have found and alleged, to defraud and rob, combined with

	schemes to hide these criminal acts as a way of doing business

	is, on the other hand, exactly what congress wished to eliminate

	through the RICO statutes.  It is not our intent merely to

	relitigate an issue of bad faith either as itself or cast in

	another form.


	We note that among the releases and stipulations in case I

	Affidavit Exhibits [Record: vol. 1-2, #19], the stipulation

	for Hammel, is not a dismissal with prejudice.  In addition,

	regarding Hammel's release contract, Indemnity is still in

	breach.  Objections [Record: vol. 4, #40, p. 8, parag. 21].

	The releases provide for future performance, and therefore,

	continuing fiduciary duty.

	The New Jersey Court's dismissal of Bad Faith claims Affidavit

	Exhibits [Record: vol. 1-2, #19], can only cover those claims

	known, committed and accrued up to the time of that dismissal,

	which was March 18, 1997.

                                  Issue #2

        Whether the findings of fact, by the district court in its de

	novo review, to which the law has been applied, are accurate

	regarding the extant record, and sufficient to its conclusion,

	and whether the court erred in the rules, so as to prejudice

	our case.

        Supporting facts and argument, Memorandum [Record: vol. 4, #50]

	Memorandum p.1 - "Having conducted a de novo review to those
	   portions of the recommendation to which specific objections
	   were filed, the recommendation is adopted."

	We do not see evidence of a de novo review of our specific

	objections [Record vol. 4 #46] to the recommendation

	[Record: vol. 4, #45].


	Memorandum p.2 - "Both Plaintiffs received minor injuries"

	We each received injuries that put damaging pressure on our

	spinal cords, a fact known to Indemnity.  Memorandum Exhibits

	[Record: vol. 3, #29], Affidavit [Record: vol. 4, #32].

	Memorandum p.2 - "Because they were dissatisfied with the
	   handling of their claims and the coverage provided, ...."

	We were "dissatisfied" that the "coverage provided" was not

	that which we had carefully chosen for our protection, under

	New Jersey's no-fault law, and for which we had paid our

	premiums.  We sued to obtain necessary surgery without

	which we would suffer permanent disabling neurologic injury.

	Indemnity, knowing this, refused to pay, hence, we sued.

	Indemnity's delay has destroyed business capabilities, caused

	serious spinal cord injury, left each of us at the mercy of

	his irreversible injuries, and destitute through a provable,

	systematic pattern of Defendants' racketering activities,

	as we have outlined [Record: vol. 4, #30].

	Memorandum p.3 - "These causes of action all stem from
	   Indemnity's handling of Plaintiffs' claims, coverage
	   and benefits."

 	1) The specifics of racketeering in claims handling, and

	   the depth of it, were unknown to us until December, 1999.

	2) Other causes of action stated in the "proposed amended

	   complaint" implicating Indemnity's attorneys, Mutual,

	   and Dr. Fremed only arose during, and as part of, the

	   New Jersey litigation and were not known to us until 


	   December, 1999 through February 2000.

	3) The actions against Mutual, Indemnity's attorneys and Dr.

	   Fremed although obliquely related, do not arise from any

	   motor vehicle accident, nor from an insurance policy;

	   they arise from patterns of racketeering.

	4) Solely at issue in case I were claims based on known

	   occurrences, predating the start of litigation, and an

	   insurance policy; at issue in case II are claims arising

	   from a set of facts postdating the start of litigation of

	   case I, and those unknown before December 1999.

	Memorandum p.3 - "In addition, each Plaintiff received
	   the sum of $25,000 in settlement of their personal
	   injury claims."

	These $25,000 sums came as the limits of the tortfeasor's

	policy with Liberty Mutual, against which Indemnity had

	already subrogated for vehicular damage.  The sums were,

	under federal law, held in escrow pending satisfaction of

	a Medicaid lien which was for our necessary spinal surgeries

	which had been paid for by Medicaid.

	Memorandum p.4 - The district court quoting from [Sutton]

	quoting [Watkins] and [Fornoratto], implies that it must

	adopt and enforce New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine.

	The citing of Sutton is subtly off point; all the various

	cases in Sutton had New Jersey as their forum state.  In

	such a situation, a federal district court would indeed be

	obliged under 28 USC 1738, and the laws of New Jersey, to


	apply entire controversy if it were found logically

	applicable since these all involved successive suits.

	[See Feinsod below]

	Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has made it clear

	that the entire controversy doctrine does not have an

	extraterritorial effect.

	   "The issue in this case, most broadly stated, is whether the
	   doctrine [of entire controversy] has an extraterritorial
	   effect." [Mortgagelinq]

	Agreeing with New Jersey's Appellate division, in a prior

	determination in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court


	   "Maintaining a cohesive federal system (and the Full Faith
	   and Credit Clause melds the state courts into that system)
	   does not require that the other parts of the federal system
	   honor our entire controversy doctrine." Id.

	Regarding the entire controversy doctrine [Judicial Article],

	in [Olds] Justice Stein, in a separately filed opinion,

	concurring in part and dissenting in part, quotes himself in a

	dissenting opinion in [Prevratil].

           "The framers of the Judicial Article of the 1947 Constitution
	   would be appalled to learn that the "fusion of the powers of
	   Law and Chancery in one Superior Court," designed to avoid
	   the delay and duplication that results from "the splitting
	   of a controversy," has been transformed into a bureaucratic
	   procedural snare that closes the courthouse doors to innocent
	   litigants with meritorious claims. The Court ignores at its
	   peril the profound words of Justice Jacobs, one of the
	   primary authors of the Judicial Article: "After all, Justice
	   is the polestar and our procedures must ever be moulded and
	   applied with that in mind."

	Even if the district court elects in its discretion to adopt

	and enforce the entire controversy doctrine, the facts preclude

	its application:


	   "[34] Even assuming the Full Faith and Credit Act applies
	   absent a final judgment or order of a state court, a
	   proposition about which we express serious doubts, the
	   district court misapplied the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
	   We look to the development of that Doctrine by the New
	   Jersey courts to determine whether a New Jersey court would
	   give preclusive effect to a litigation that has not yet been
	   concluded. That question has been squarely addressed and
	   answered in the negative in Kaselaan & D'Angelo Assocs., Inc.
	   v. Soffian, 675 A.2d 705, 707, 708 (N.J. Super.  App.  Div.
	   1996). There, the court held that 'the entire controversy
	   doctrine only precludes successive suits involving related
	   claims. It does not require dismissal when multiple actions
	   involving the same or related claims are pending
	   simultaneously.' Id. at 708." [Rycoline]

	New Jersey would not have barred our second action since it was

	not successive to the first action, does not involve the same

	parties or their privies and does not arise out of the same set

	of facts.  None of the criteria for application are present.

	Memorandum p.4-5 - "New Jersey has a racketeering ...
	   statute .... Thus, Plaintiffs could have presented
	   this claim in the state court action."

	This is an incorrect syllogism since a predicate of it is false:

	it ignores the very large volume of reproduced Discovery

	documents from Indemnity, delivered to our attorneys about two

	weeks after they had finally been granted access to depose

	Indemnity's employees.  At the time they received them, said

	documents were all but useless to our attorneys.

	That our attorneys did not then spend weeks scrutinizing

	these documents should be understandable.  They were retained

	to litigate what should have been a simple and clear insurance

	case, and had no expectation that the documents contained

	information which revealed criminal activities of Indemnity,


	et. al., and therefore that lack of scrutiny should be held,

	at very most, as reasonable neglect.

	Memorandum p.5 - " ... that the amended complaint should be
	   stricken as in violation of Rule 8."

	We have no doubt that the proposed amended complaint is overly

	long and that it could have been streamlined and shortened,

	but not within the time imposed by the court, without any

	further extension of time [Record: vol. 1-2, #25], taking into

	account the reading, deciphering, chronologizing cataloging and

	comparing the thousands of pages of discovery materials

	received from our attorneys on December 1 and 10, 1999.

	We did move the court for permission to correct our amended

	complaint [Record: vol. 4, #42], but that permission was never


	Given the number of pages we had to process in a limited time,

	we did our best to balance the requirements of "specificity and

	particularity" required by RICO, with the requirements of

	brevity required by Rule 8.  That we erred on the side of

	"specificity and particularity" should not be a bar to us

	exercising our right under FRCP 15(b).  Our proposed amended

	complaint was not in violation of FRCP 12(f), though some

	redundancy was necessary in satisfying particularity.  Though

	our complaint may seem inflated, an irreducible substance of it

	is permitted by FRCP 8(e)(2) which states "a party may set forth

	two or more statements of a claim ... alternately or 


	hypothetically, either in one count ... or in separate 

	counts ... ".

	Many RICO complaints are relatively long due to the above


	Our complaint was further extended to the point of entirety

	so that it alleged all the causes of action that fit the facts

	then known to us.

	Memorandum p.5 - " ... would add 33 defendants ..."

	The district court was quickly made aware that the adding of 33

	additional defendants was an error and not our intent.

        Memorandum, [Record: vol. 4, #40, p.2],

        Objections, [Record: vol. 4, #45, p. 12, parag. 36]

	Memorandum p.5 - " ... as well as two physicians who evaluated
	   the Plaintiffs for purposes of coverage."

	This assumes our contentions to be false, in contradiction of

	established procedure.  Our expressed contention is that these

	evaluations were exactly part of Indemnity's patterns of

	racketeering. [Record: vol. 3, #29; vol. 4, #31], where, by

	comparing one of Dr. Fremed's reviews with the documents which

	he claims to review, his paper review is shown to be bogus on

	its face.  This paper review of Dr. Fremed was not served

	upon Hammel's attorney, Paul Jackson, until after the PIP

	case had terminated, Certification by Paul J. Jackson [Record:

	#46], page 3, paragraph 3.


	Since the district court had already abridged our right to

	amend prior to a responsive pleading, our assumption was that

	until told to the contrary, the court usurped power regarding

	amendments.  We submitted, therefore, motions to amend and

	correct [Record: vol. 1-2, #26; vol. 4, #42], which were

	never ruled upon.

	In violating rule 15(b), by ordering a motion to amend while

	there was no responsive pleading from Defendants, and then

	holding our complaint in a continuing suspension, the court

	has severely prejudiced our case by giving the defendants

	a relatively vast length of time within which to prepare a

	defense.  We note that defendant Mutual has been known to

	destroy evidence not in its favor; Memorandum [Record: vol.

	4, #30].

                                 Issue #3

        Whether our proposed amended complaint should have been

	stricken outright and whether we maintain the right, under

	FRCP 15(a) to amended this complaint.

	Procedural History:

	On November 4, 1999, we moved the district court for an

	extension of time to respond to Defendants' Motion to

	Dismiss. Motion [Record: vol. 1-2, #22]  In that motion

	we said that an amended complaint would be necessary,

	both to answer Defendants' motion, and because of new



	In their Response [Record: vol. 1-2, #24] to our motion,

	Defendants "request that the Court require [us]

	either (1) respond...or (2) file an Amended Complaint."

	In an Order [Record: vol. 1-2, #25] granting our extension,

	the Magistrate Judge says "There will be no further extensions

	and plaintiffs shall file with the court that day their

	response and/or their Motion to Amend accompanied by their

	proposed Amended Complaint."

	We received the court's order (#25) so closely on the heels

	of Defendants' response (#24), a day or two, that we had no

	possibility of objecting.

	We complied with that Order, filing the Motion to Amend

	[Record: vol. 1-2, #26] and our proposed amended complaint.

	Receiving no response, and realizing that the proposed amended

	complaint needed correction and re-working, on April 4, 1999,

	we filed a Motion [Record: vol. 4, #42] to correct it.  We never

	received response to that motion, except as follows:

	On April 11, 1999, the Magistrate Judge filed his Memorandum

	and Recommendation [Record: vol. 4, #45], in which he states,

	in error, that "In their response defendants...did request

	that the court require plaintiffs to filing

	either a responsive brief or a motion to amend their complaint."


	We called the district court's attention to this discrepancy

	in our Objections [Record: vol. 4, #46, Paragraphs 4-7] to the

	Memorandum and Recommendation.


	While there was no responsive pleading from Mutual or Indemnity,

	the magistrate ordered, contrary to FRCP 15(a), that we submit

	a motion to amend [Record: vol. 1-2, #25]; then recommended that

	the motion be denied because it was unnecessary [Record: vol. 4,

	#45, p. 6].  Objections: [Record: vol. 4, #46, p. 2].

	Our amended complaint has always been held provisional, and

	has not been docketed; so, no amended complaint has been

	formally filed, and there is still no responsive pleading.

	We were literally at an impasse.  We knew our proposed amended

	complaint had to be corrected, and acted with all due diligence

	to secure the district court's permission to do so.  The

	district court never responded to our motion to correct, then

	struck the proposed amended complaint under FRCP 8, and denied

	as "unnecessary" the very Motion to Amend, which that court,

	itself, ordered us to file.

	We claim the proposed amended complaint should not be stricken,

	and that we should maintain the right, under FRCP 15(a), to

	file a corrected amended complaint.


                                 Issue #4

        Whether our claims of Bad Faith should be barred by

	any preclusionary doctrine.

	If a claim of Bad Faith has been dismissed without Plaintiff

	being permitted to present his evidence, giving the defendant

	a green light to pursue further and more aggressive and damaging

	acts of Bad Faith while being immune to litigation, then by

	later applying res judicata, justice is hardly being done.

	The Dismissals of Bad Faith claims (04/18/97) cannot be taken

	out of context; they were, on certifications of our Counsels

	[Record: vol. 4, #46], on the basis of the absence of

	controlling law.  This dismissal with prejudice was in essence

	a refusal by the court to resolve the issue of bad faith

	because it felt incompetent to do so.  In [Watkins 57], in

	discussion of the phrase "on the merits", the court concludes:

            "Semantics aside, the rule remains that a dismissal based
	    on a court's procedural inability to consider a case will
	    not preclude a subsequent action on the same claim,
	    Restatement (Second) of Judgments, supra, '
	    19 comment a, ' 20, ...."

	This is the law of New Jersey according to its Supreme Court,

	which, regarding the dismissal of bad faith claims, the district

	court is obliged to obey.  It obviates preclusion of any of our

	subsequent Bad Faith claims.

	We are not asking the District Court, nor the Fourth Circuit

	to "review" the dismissals of Bad Faith in the New Jersey

	Court, but merely to apply unambiguous New Jersey Law, as the

	federal courts are obliged, to unambiguous facts.


	We note also that the dismissals of bad faith claims were

	not accompanied by any explicit findings of fact or law;

	they were vague dismissals "for good cause".  Our claims

	were not ultimately available under any controlling New

	Jersey Law, Certification of Paul J. Jackson [Record: vol.

	4, #46 attachments].  These claims should not be barred in

	the current action filed by citizens of North Carolina,

	in one of its district courts, merely because they were deemed

	unavailable by lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the

	New Jersey court; that this would be true was not at all

	clear at the time of the New Jersey filings.  For these

	claims to be barred without ever being heard would seriously

	compromise our rights to redress and due process under the

	Fourteenth Amendment.

	Other claims of Bad Faith in case II arise from facts and

	knowledge that postdate the dismissal of Bad Faith by the

	Superior Court of New Jersey.  These have caused each of

	us serious injury.  Such claims should not be barred by

	any preclusionary doctrine.  [See Lawlor below]

	Under North Carolina law and the law of most other States,

	Bad Faith Suits are instituted after the conclusion of PIP

	suits.  Bad Faith is considered by many and possibly most courts

	to be extracontractual.  Such claims should then not be bound

	to an insurance contract and the laws of the State in which

	it was agreed to. 


	The district court cites [Dowdell] quoting [Feinsod] and

	a sequence of predecessors as authority for its general

	dismissal of our case under preclusionary doctrines.

	In Feinsod, quoting at [16],

	   A dismissal with prejudice "constitutes an adjudication on
	   the merits as fully and completely as if the order had been
	   entered after a trial." Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498,
	   507, 589 A.2d 143 (1991); see Christiansen v. Christiansen,
	   46 N.J.  Super. 101, 109, 134 A.2d 14 (App.Div.1957), certif.
	   denied, 25 N.J. 56, 134 A.2d 833; see also Lawlor v. National
	   Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327, 75 Sup.Ct. 865, 868,
	   99 L. Ed.  1122, 1127 (1955) (stating that dismissal of a
	   complaint with prejudice after settlement bars SUBSEQUENT
	   suit on SAME cause of action against SAME parties); Gambocz
	   v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir.1972) (holding that
	   voluntary withdrawal of suit resulting in "dismissal with
	   prejudice constitutes an adjudication of the merits as fully
	   and completely as if the order had been entered after trial"
	   and "res judicata bars relitigation of the claims dismissed
	   in the prior suit").

	   [Emphatic capitalization ours]

	The predicates to bar are not satisfied in our case.

	On following the sequence of authorities back to [Gambocz],

	the final authority is [Lawlor] This is a reasonably

	complex antitrust suit which determines that plaintiffs'

	1949 case against original and added defendants was not

	barred by their 1943 case under res judicata,

	   "Since the 1943 case was not accompanied by findings,
	   it did not bind the parties on any issue ... which might
	   arise in connection with another cause of action.".

	We should not then be barred in successive Bad Faith claims

	by res judicata.

                           A Matter of Consistency

	The district court relies, for timing, on dates of signatures

	for all but our initial complaint, yet our signatures on


	the initial complaint, March 11, 1999, predate any offers of

	settlement by Defendant Indemnity.  It was clearly our intent

	to file the complaint in March of 1999.

	If signature dates are to be used, then they should be used

	consistently; so used, the dates imply Case II is not

	subsequent.  The formal filing date for the complaint in

	case II was August 3, 1999, while the stipulations terminating

	case I were filed August 6, 1999, implying again that case II

	is not subsequent.  It should be wrong to consider case II to

	be subsequent to case I.

	Notwithstanding the matter of whether case II was subsequent to

	case I, the cases arise from different sets of facts and involve

	different parties who could not have been joined in case I.


	Moreover, after the dismissal, Mutual and Indemnity, in concert,

	continued their acts of Bad Faith and Racketeering against us.

	Neither Indemnity nor Mutual should be relieved of their

	responsibilities and fiduciary duties subsequent to the decision

	of the Superior Court of New Jersey, and should be subject to

	the laws of North Carolina for their subsequent actions.

	One would hope that all such preclusionary doctrines adopted

	by our courts would be adopted for the purposes of fairness,

	a principle that is implicit in the rules of procedure where

	it is everywhere required of the parties and of the courts

	that actions be judged "so that justice is done".  



	A- Regarding our dismissal with prejudice by the District

	   Court, that it was improper and should be reversed.

	B- Regarding the entire controversy doctrine of New Jersey,

	   that it is inapplicable.

	C- Regarding res judicata, that it is inapplicable.

	D- Regarding accord and satisfaction, that it is inapplicable.

	   We have already contended that Indemnity's PIP and UIM

	   settlements were in furtherance of its racketeering

	   activities, and its scheme to hide these activities,

	   Objections: [Record: vol. 4, #46, pp. 4-5].

	E- Regarding FRCP 12(b)(6), that there do exist claims

	   upon which we can be granted relief.

	F- Regarding complaint length under FRCP 8

	   We have addressed this above and in our Objections

	   Objections: [Record: vol. 4, #46, pp. 4-5].

	G- THEREFORE, our requested relief should be granted.




                               Relief Requested:

	Reversal of the Order to dismiss with prejudice, and remanding

	with instructions:

	That our Bad Faith Claims not be dismissed;

	That our proposed amended complaint not be stricken, but that

	we have by right;

	Permission to submit our corrected amended complaint which will

	shorten and streamline the proposed amended complaint, as

	well as conform it to the orders of this court;

	A continuance of 90 days to rewrite our amended complaint.



	                     Table of Authorities:

	Amendment XIV

	FRCP 8, 12, 15

	28 USC 1738

	Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
	No. 890905231, slip op. at 53 (Third Judicial Dist., Salt Lake
	City, Utah, Aug. 3, 1998)

	Feinsod v. Janeen H. Noon, 617 A.2d 1234, 261 N.J.Super. 82
	(N.J.Super.App.Div. 12/18/1992)

	Fornoratto v.  American Waterworks Co., Inc.
	144 F.3d 276, 278 (3rd Cir. 1998)

	Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 10/12/1972)

	Lawlor et al. v. National Screen Service,
	1955.SCT.748 ,
	349 U.S.  322, 75 S.  Ct. 865, 99 L. Ed. 1122.

	Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.,
	662 A.2d 536, 142 N.J. 336 (N.J. 08/01/1995)

	Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 150 N.J. 424 (N.J.
	07/16/1997), [192-193]  Justice

	Prevratil v. Mohr 145 N.J. 180, 211, 678 A.2d 243 (1996):

	Rycoline Products Inc. v. C & W Unlimited,
	109 F.3d 883 (3d Cir. 03/25/1997)

	Sutton v. Sutton, No. 99-573 (D.N.J. 10/13/1999), 71 F.Supp.2d
	383, 390 (D.N.J 1999), aff'd 216 F.3d 1077 (3rd Cir. 2000)

	Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel and Casino Inc.,
	124 NJ 398, 412, 591 A.2d 592 (1991)

	Referenced parts of the record:

	vol. 1-2, #19, #22, #24, #25, #26, #28.

	vol. 3, #29

	vol. 4, #30, #31, #40, #42, #45, #46, #50.

	Proposed Amended Complaint



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Created: February 9, 2001
Last Updated: February 9, 2001