It has been traditional RICO case law that that the statute says exactly and only what it says: that only damages of business and property are compensible under 18 USCA 1964(c), the civil cause of action.

We argue that damages should be considered, under RICO, more broadly under certain circumstances, and that these circumstances arise in our Amended Complaint.

To start at the beginning go the DIARY PAGE.


             WILLIAM C. HAMMEL,                    |
             ALAN J. BELLAMENTE,                   |
             et al.,                               |      MEMORANDUM ON
                                                   |         DAMAGES
                  Plaintiffs                       |           AND
                                                   |        CAUSALITY
                   vs.                             |      (Attachment 6)
             STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE          |
             INSURANCE CO.,                        |      No. 2:99:CV-44-T
             STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANY,         |
             et al.                                |
                  Defendants                       |



	Plaintiffs will argue, in nonexclusive alternatives:  That
	real and permanent business and property damages were primary
	in this particular case; that consequential personal damages
	flowed proximately from these primary business damages; that
	damages to business were also personal damages in this case,
	and that personal and business damages need not be seen as
	one flowing from the other, but that they are simultaneous and
	and independent with intertwining consequences as time
	progresses; and that damages compensable under RICO in this
	particular case should not be solely restricted to those of
	business and property precisely because of the legally
	intertwined conditions of persons and businesses.  Finally,
	Plaintiffs argue, generally, that although in SEDIMA, S.P.R.L.
	v. IMREX Co., 473 US 479 (1985), the court quietly accepts
	that only "business and property" are compensable under RICO,
	Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion actually gives
	reason to expand this restriction on damages, in some cases,
	rather than giving the reductio ad absurdum argument that he
	sought in order to contradict the majority opinion.


	18 Chap. 96 nowhere defines the meaning of of the word 'business',
	and there are several ways in which it can be construed.

	There are 'businesses' whose sole purpose is to make a profit,
	and from which an owner and/or employees derive income directly or
	indirectly by providing goods and/or services; there are not for
	profit businesses, 501(C)(3), which may not produce a profit;
	a "Subchapter S" corporation is expected to lose money in its
	infancy while it is being capitalized and building its power
	to produce income.

	The American College Encyclopedic Dictionary, Spencer Press (1953)
	gives as the first meaning, "one's occupation, profession or trade";
	Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (2d ed.) (1953) gives eight
	meanings, the first is obs. "busyness", the second gives "one's
	rightful work or personal concern", the third gives "one's particular,
	esp. one's regular work, occupation, or employment".  Any specific
	involvement with commercial or economic matters appear at and
	below the sixth meaning.  There is no specific requirement that one
	derives income from the activity or even nonactivity of one's
	business, although the possibility is inherent.

	The destruction of businesses that produce a product but do not
	produce income, is still an immediate injury to business even
	though one can also see consequent direct injury to future product
	or future income.  Plaintiff Hammel had "businesses" that consisted
	of scientific research and artistic production, upon which he
	worked for over 20 years, yet that produce little or no income,
	around the time of the MVA, and also around the time of the
	injuries being discernable as having direct cause in the
	racketeering enterprises of the Defendants.

	These non-income producing businesses nevertheless had existence
	and production can be demonstrated.  These too have sustained
	injures diretly caused, by Defedants' Racketeering activities,
	to be destroyed.  Yet are they not businesses with future potential
	of income?


	HOW property and business suffered setbacks from the MVA:
	Initial consequences of the MVA are the issue of State suits in

	New Jersey.

	   physical               - DAMAGES (reversible)
	   business             |
	   property - financial | - SETBACKS

	Initial damages caused physical, business and property SETBACKS
	that were recoverable, and physical DAMAGES, that were also
	correctable, recoverable, and reversible at the time of SFI's
	denials of all medical benefits, which benefits were reasonably
	expected by Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs do not claim these initial
	and reversible injuries, nor seek recompense for them.  That is
	a matter for the Judicial System of New Jersey.

	Were it not for the activities of the enterprises, these damages
	and setbacks would have been mended so as not to have resulted
	in any significant discontinuity in either Plaintiff's life, and
	would not have left Plaintiffs with permanent and severe damages.
	This is what gives rise to Plaintiffs' Federal claims and the
	damages for which they seek recompense.  Plaintiffs explain in
	more detail in the following subsections B and C.

                        HISTORY and BACKGROUND

	Before the MVA of September 16, 1994:

	Plaintiff Bellamente had been recovering from a previous
	MVA of August 6, 1992, which occurred while he was insured
	by State Farm Mutual.  During that recovery period, business
	setbacks resulted, no claims for which were made.

	Plaintiff Hammel had never been injured in any MVA, was
	active and athletic, and was completely asymptomatic regarding
	any alleged previous physical or emotional conditions that
	have ensued.

	Business setbacks of Plaintiffs' began with the decreased ability
	of both Plaintiffs to own, operate and maintain a retail video
	rental business, a computer consulting business, and a not
	uncomplicated conservatorship.

	After SFI's unlawful denials of medical benefits, Plaintiffs'
	time and energy, required to deal with unending patterns of
	racketeering tactics of SFI in denying claims and delaying their
	responses, precluded Plaintiffs' normal and usual operations
	of their businesses.

	By the time Plaintiffs understood the scheme of calculated
	fraud of SFI, their business setbacks, having been made so
	severe, found it financially impossible to seek the necessary
	medical treatment, except under the insurance benefits to
	which they were entitled.

	Though there were physical injuries from the MVA, as all Plaintiffs'
	treating physicians, as well as SFI's 3 IMEs by Dr. Linder, have
	affirmed, those were seemingly acute in nature, and occurring at
	the time of MVA. They are totally distinct from injuries claimed
	here, which were knowingly, and recklessly inflicted on Plaintiffs
	through the racketeering enterprises of the Defendants.

	The injury, to business and business property, being its complete
	loss, along with the loss of the ability "to do business" and
	"to work", meaning to work reliably in some way, did NOT flow from
	the MVA injuries, but rather exactly from the racketeering activities
	of the defendants, and their predicate acts, the purpose of which
	was to profit mutually, and to annihilate the insurance in fact,
	that plaintiffs had been paying for, and relied upon.

	When the inevitablitiy of loss of business and residence became
	clear in November 1995, the last desperate act was the writing
	of the complaints to The New Jersey Department of Insurance
	Department of Consumer Complaints.  The amount of time and energy
	required to write those was enormous, all of which should have
	been spent on what was left of the video business.  That practically
	removed Plaintiff Hammel from business activities.


	In 1988 Plaintiff Bellamente was appointed conservator for his
	elderly aunt Edna M. Clough, manged her care and investments,
	and continued as conservator until about March 1995, when he
	finally had to resign that appointment due to loss of his ability
	properly to manage his aunt's affairs.  Plaintiff Bellamente's
	income from that source was then lost.

	As a result of a prior MVA in 1992, Plaintiff Bellamente's retail
	video rental businesses in Midland Park, New Jersey, and then in
	Rochelle Park, New Jersey, had to be closed, in 1993 and 1994
	respectively. Those businesses were operated as Ultra Videos
	Inc., a corporation begun by Plaintiff Bellamente, et. al.,
	in 1991.  Plaintiff Hammel designed and wrote the computer
	software, installed and maintained all hardware used to operate
	the businesses, and was an officer in Ultra Videos Inc.

	On August 6, 1993, a retail video rental business was opened by
	both Plaintiffs, in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey with Plaintiff
	Bellamente as a d/b/a.  As Plaintiff Bellamente's abilities became
	more limited, that business was sold to Plaintiff Hammel early in
	1994 and the d/b/a "Ultra Videos" was relinquished by Plaintiff
	Bellamente, and registered to Plaintiff Hammel.

	This remaining video store in Ridgefield Park was about 13 months
	in operation at the time of the MVA.  Plaintiffs had taken, and
	continued to take as little money from the video business as possible
	in order that the money be reinvested in a business that was started
	completely new, in order to build a strong inventory that would
	attract customers.  At the time of the MVA, by having done that,
	and through Plaintiffs' physical presence and business concept of
	the highest level of personal service, the business thrived in that
	one year, greatly exceeding their initially calculated growth, so
	that salaries might just begin to have been taken.

	Important to the growth of the video business was Plaintiffs'
	physical presence and interaction with customers, Plaintiffs
	made it a practice to: learn customers' names and their tastes
	and needs; waive late charges and give free rentals to those
	they learned had their own personal setbacks; and knew the
	movies that were being rented, and whether a given movie would
	be suitable for a customer's children.  Plaintiffs' absences
	for physical and medical reasons, and their difficulty in
	keeping up with ordering and knowing their increasing stock
	were, at first, tolerated by their customers. Plaintiffs had
	one occasional helper in their friend, Mrs. Patricia Buser.
	Mrs. Buser's knowledge and abilities matched those of Plaintiffs,
	and her acceptance of, and dedication to their business concept
	made her invaluable as she tended the business, most frequently
	without remuneration, after the MVA, when neither Plaintiff
	could, to help mitigate business setbacks.

	In November 1994, Plaintiff Bellamente was caused to fall down
	stairs by MVA injury related numbness and weakness in his feet.
	His chiropractor immediately arranged an emergency appointment
	with a neurologist, and it became apparent that Plaintiff had
	injuries more serious than thought, requiring treatment by other
	than a chiropractor.  This Plaintiff was referred to Peter H.
	Schmaus, M.D., Gary Alweiss, M.D., and other physicians.

	Around December of 1994, chiropractor, Dr. Peter N. Boulukos
	became suspicious that physical damages were present that
	might require other than chiropractic treatment in Plaintiff
	Hammel as well, and referred him to Peter H. Schmaus, M.D. In
	preparation for these visits to Dr. Schmaus, and others, Dr.
	Boulukos ordered radiologicals of the apparently insulted
	body parts, which indeed showed, according to radiological
	reports and consultations with other physicians, the existence
	of damages that required a more aggressive, and medical, in
	addition to chiropractic treatment.


	HOW business and property were permanently damaged, and how
	permanent personal injury was sustained by both Plaintiffs: 

	Prolongation of benefit denial by contrived and fraudulent
	delays of Defendants SFI and SFM, through their patterns of
	racketeering activities, caused parallel business and personal
	setbacks to be thrown into an indefinite future, and were
	cumulative, as Plaintiffs became unable even to plan appropriately.
	There was a point after the denials when Defendants SFM and SFI
	began to cause damages that were not reversible.  It was their
	denials and delays as acts committed within the enterprises that
	caused actual property and business damages by wasting Plaintiffs'
	time and energy to deal with SFI that would otherwise have
	profitably been spent on operating Plaintiffs' businesses.
	If not for the intrusion of these racketeering enterprises,
	these business damages would never have occurred.  Plaintiffs
	business prospered beyond their expectations, within their
	period of business' existence due to Plaintiffs' attention 
	and good management until the racketeering schemes of the
	Defendants interfered considerably with that attention and
	good management.

	Moreover, Plaintiffs' daily activities ineluctably shifted
	from their proper businesses to the daily chores of attempting
	to deal with Defendant SFI in the matter of its unlawful
	denials of medical benefits stemming from its patterns of
	racketeering activities.  The amount of necessary time and
	effort expended on dealing with SFI severely and harmfully
	distracted Plaintiffs' attention from their proper businesses.
	Failure of Plaintiffs' attention to their businesses, already
	being hampered by the lack of appropriate treatment of their
	physical injuries resulting from the accident, and being
	exacerbated by having to deal with SFI's unwarranted intransigence
	in parallel, caused further business injuries, leading from
	rapidly declining income to loss of property: the inability to
	pay business debts caused Plaintiffs to liquidate personal
	property, which was insufficient to prevent foreclosure on
	Plaintiff Bellamente's residence, which both Plaintiffs occupied
	and in which Plaintiff Hammel had a money interest.

	Though, initially, there were both business and property
	damages, and also physical and other personal damages,
	these ran in parallel, as opposed to business damages having
	been solely caused by the physical damages.  Permanent physical
	damages may be one much later proximate cause of permanent
	business damages, which is to say the inability to ressurect
	a business of any sort, but that is not the the direct damage
	in their RICO claims of the first first epoch in New Jersey.
	The prolongation of the racketeering activities of the enterprises,
	even into the litigation process itself, is the overriding
	cause of both permanenancy of business and physical failures,
	separately and together.  Both epochs separately are the issues
	in this action.

	The video business and the computer consulting business owned
	by Plaintiff Hammel were both run, not as corporations, but
	as d/b/a's.  Thus the notion of business, business property,
	person and personal property were not distinct entities.
	A registered d/b/a preserves a "business name" that is attached
	to the person who is doing business.  The d/b/a, which is the
	business is, in fact, simply a protected name for the person.
	Setbacks and damages to business were compensated by personal
	reserves.  That a business setback or loss is also a personal
	setback or loss is a result of Plaintiffs prudently attempting
	to mitigate their damages by preserving business and income,
	not a result of direct personal damage.

	The denials, delays, deceit, and trickery, used to hide
	essential fraud, extortion, breaches, and other torts
	committed by defendants acting within the enterprises in
	patterns of racketeering activities have:

	   a. caused large additional business and property damages
	      as a result of acts committed by defendants within the
	      enterprises, changing what would have been setbacks into
	      irrecoverable and irreversible damages.

	   b. made all damages irrecoverable, except by Plaintiff's
	      present action in this Court.

	These acts, and their continuation despite repeated notice
	to SFI over a period of five (5) years have each, separately
	and together, contributed to:

	   a. causing great further physical damages

	   b. making the physical damages of a. irrecoverable
	      and irreversible, causing

	   c. a. and b. causing debilitating and long term, and
	      possibly permanent psychological damages 

	   d. a., b. and c. causing further physical and property
	      damages, and the destruction of future income and
	      life as it was known to Plaintiffs
	   e. a., b., c. and d. creating future damages which
	      require extraordinary financial, physical,
	      psychological and medical support for the remainder
	      of both Plaintiffs' lives.

	Permanent Personal damages that arose from the claims
	handling tactics, which are an inherent scheme in the

	Defendants' SFI and SFM's patterns of racketeering activities,
	put both Plaintiffs in the economic position of not being able
	to transcend the denials of medical benefits and proceed with
	medically necessary surgeries.  Surgeries were eventually
	performed when Plaintiffs, deprived of all income by Defendants,
	became sufficiently impoverished to be able to receive Medicaid
	under SSI, in North Carolina.  Though SSI qualification merely
	confirmed disability on medical grounds, it is clear that
	Plaintiffs' disabilities and their impoverishment did not
	appear magically at that moment.  The actual financial disabilities
	were the reason for Plaintiffs' move from New Jersey to their
	current residence in one of North Carolina's most remote and
	isolated areas.

	When through a business damage, a personal damage is caused
	that disables a person from all physical activities he has
	previously known, this is an even more grievous damage than
	should all his business and property simply be destroyed.

	In the latter case, it is still possible, though perhaps
	difficult to start anew.  In the former case of extensive
	disability, even this option has been removed, so that
	business and personal damages stemming from continued
	business damages are both irrevocable and irreversible.
	Unless both business and property damages, and personal
	damages are all compensable under the conditions of this
	case, business and property damages, compensable under
	RICO, become, in fact, not compensable, thus violating
	the notion of compensability as prescribed in the statutory
	language.  This is a particular case where personal damages
	should be allowed as coalescent with business and property
	damages in conformity with the provision of RICO's Liberal
	Construction Clause, that this title "shall be liberally
	construed in order to effect its remedial purposes."

	One should then ask: what are the remedial purposes of RICO?
	From the RICO Statute, one reads in the:

                Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose

        "It is the purpose of this Act [see Short Title note above]
	to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States
	by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
	by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
	sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
	those engaged in organized crime."

	Also, in SEDIMA, the Court finds the remedial purposes of RICO
	powerfully expressed in 1964(c), empowering its civil remedies.

	In their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, or in
	the Alternative to Stay, at II(A),  Defendants argue:

	   "An allegation of personal injury and pecuniary
	   losses occurring therefrom are not sufficient to
	   meet the statutory requirement of injury to "business
	   or property." (Bast v Cohen, Dunn & Sinclair, PC,
	   59 F.3d 492, 495 (4th cir.  l995) See also (McMurtry v
	   Brasfield, 654 R. Supp, l224-25 (E.D..Va.l987)
	   (plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for emotional distress
	   and similar personal injuries.)

	Plaintiffs have already argued that, in this case, the concepts
	of "business and property" damages may not be, in actuality, as
	distinct from "personal damages" as they might ordinarily be
	construed because of the special circumstances of this action.

	In Bast, the only injuries claimed were indeed personal,
	and only "extreme mental anguish" resulting from the
	acquisition of knowledge; there were no business or property
	damages, nor were they alleged.  These citations then, are
	not all applicable to the facts and allegations of this

	Most Courts hold, even outside of RICO, that personal damages
	in the form of mental distress, anguish or anxiety are not
	compensable unless there has been an underlying physical
	damage from which it results or with which it is associated.
	Mental anguish or distress alone is generally not compensable,
	except under certain unusual circumstances.  Applying the mold,
	and therefore the conclusions, of the constructions in damages
	of the Bast Court to the present case is inappropriate.  It does
	not fit the present facts nor Plaintiffs' constructions.

	Medically, it is well known that emotional damages can be
	involved in a cyclic way with physical damages; and it is
	clear that emotional damages can also be similarly involved
	with loss of business and property, most especially when the
	business is the person.

	The causal relationships approached using the usual proximate
	cause analysis becomes quickly a nexus of proximate causes
	rather than a tree of relationships, and followed further becomes
	an imprecise froth of causal relationships from which a subfroth that
	might be labeled "personal", cannot be reasonably extracted.

	Defendants subsequently go on to say:

	   "Put another way, there must be a 'discernible causal
	   connection' or 'nexus' between the acts of the defendant
	   and the complained-of harm to the plaintiff.
	   (HMK Corp. v Walsey, 637 F. Supp.  at 716)."

	Plaintiffs do not see that this is the same thing put another
	way, but, nevertheless, show in their amended complaint, based
	on new evidence, that such a nexus of acts by Defendants has
	caused the totality of damages herein complained of.
	Defendants also state:

	   "Because the personal injuries and pecuniary losses alleged
	   in the Complaint resulted from a motor vehicle accident,
	   and were not proximately caused by any alleged conduct by
	   Defendants, Plaintiffs lack RICO standing."

	Either Plaintiffs have not been clear, or Defendants have
	misread Plaintiffs' allegations.  In either case, Plaintiffs'
	Amended Complaint is clear on the allegations, that the severe,
	irrecoverable and irreversible damages to Plaintiffs are indeed
	the result of "conduct by Defendants" in their patterns of
	racketeering activities.

	In the cases cited by Defendants, the facts of the cases
	did not include discernible business or property damage at
	all, and those plaintiffs sought damages of emotional distress
	only, or sought business or property damages that were not
	real or substantive.  

	Plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint do show a causal nexus
	leading from Defendants' activities and substantive damages
	to Plaintiffs.

	The facts of cases cited by Defendants do not fairly meet
	the facts of the present case and so are misapplied.

	It is true that as a result of the MVA of September 16,
	1994 plaintiffs experienced pain, and sought conservative
	treatment.  When the conservative treatment was determined
	not to be effective, Plaintiffs, in consultation with
	Dr. Boulukos, sought further investigation of the cause of
	the pain.  Then, through various radiologicals the source
	of pain was discovered, early in 1995.  Proper, yet prudent
	action was taken, first in Plaintiff Bellamente's case, since,
	at the time, his condition was the more serious.

	Simple pain as the result of a simple acute injury is not a
	permanent injury, but rather a symptom; but, pain can and did
	cause injury to Plaintiffs' businesses. Through the knowing
	prolongation, by Defendants, of that pain, and the underlying
	reversible injuries suffered, by Plaintiffs this action; through
	Defendants predicate acts and their patterns of racketeering
	activities, the prime and first real injury is, in fact, the
	damage to Plaintiffs' businesses. From this injury, a complicated
	nexus of further injuries flowed, reinjuring business and property,
	as well as creating irreversible injuries to neurological systems,
	in turn causing injuries to the total body and to both Plaintiffs
	by removing their capacity to "work steadily" at anything.

	Indeed, even this very extortionately forced litigation
	itself is simultaneously economically, physically and
	emotionally damaging to both Plaintiffs.


	A conservatorship as a business (source of income) is personal.
	A d/b/a is a personally conducted business: damage to business
	and property can cause personal damages, and damage to person
	can cause business and property damages.  In fact, the lines
	between personal damages and damage to business and property
	in the case of a d/b/a are merged, even to a greater extent
	than they would be in a Subchapter S Corporation, where losses
	of the corporation may be taken as personal losses for purposes
	of personal income tax.


	Plaintiffs present the following relevant hypothetical:
	Suppose there were a person whose sole "business",
	(the activity from which he derives the income that
	supports his existence) was a calligrapher and that
	he was right handed.  As a deliberate result of his
	being the victim of a collection of racketeering
	activities, his right hand was cut off.
	How to analyze the injuries?

	One could argue that the primary injury was personal, indeed
	physical, and that any injury to his business flows directly
	from the removal of his hand on the basis that in temporal
	sequence the personal injury occurred first and that his loss
	of business doesn't happen at the time of the personal injury,
	but is rather spread out into the future.  So, possibly, the
	personal injuries as well as the business injuries would not
	be compensable under RICO since the alleged causal line of
	types of injuries is

	   personal (physical) -> business -> property

	The essential postulates of this argument are that

	   1) A single act may have only a single result

	   2) If injuries are related, then they must be
	      causally related.

	The postulates 1) and 2) are restrictive as to reality.
	The fact is that any act or event can have multiple
	consequences some of which reach into the future. Simply
	consider a person's death.

	One could then better argue that there was a primary "act",
	namely the cutting off of the hand, which had simultaneous
	multiple proximate injuries as consequences:

	   1) Personal injury to body

	   2) Immediate injury to business with long range
	      consequences that include:

		   a) Losses of income

		   b) Loss of property stemming from 2a)

		   c) Further personal injuries stemming
		      from financial inability 2a) and 2b)
		      to repair injury 1)

	   3) There arise future damages to the
	      totality of all possible businesses that are
	      peculiar to this particular person.

	The essential postulates of this argument allow that:

	   1) An act may have simultaneous consequences

	   2) An injury may extend over time (permanency)
           3) Injuries may be related in ways other than
	      by direct causal links.

	Even in this simple model case, the distinctions between
	business injuries and personal injuries are blurred in
	reality since the person *is* the business, so a physical
	damage is simultaneously a business damage and personal damage.

	Though this is a simplified hypothetical model, it is real
	enough to fit the situation where a racketeering enterprise,
	engaged in counterfeiting, might punish an engraver for refusing
	to engrave.  The model also fits the situation of this case.

	Given Congress's stated purposes, Plaintiffs find it difficult
	to believe that Congress would arbitrarily intended to deny
	the injured party relief in such a case.

	It is unlikely that Congress intended to deprive of remedies
	a particular subset of citizens whose members consist of
	those who are self employed, making them as less than citizens
	under Federal law by denying them access to the law and due
	process, because their business happens to be small enough
	so as not to need the protections of incorporation.


	Plaintiffs recite the Statutory language:

	18 U.S.C. 1964(c)
	"Any person injured in his business or property by reason
	of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
	therefor in any appropriate United States district court
	and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
	the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, ...."

	Although this section of RICO seems to require that business
	or property damage must be alleged, it does not read, nor is
	it explicit in an exclusionary or prohibitive way of other
	damages that may also be alleged and recovered. In language,
	"the damages he sustains ...", and not, "these damages he
	sustains ...", shows that the sustained damages for which
	remedy is available do not refer back to the required damages.
	By language, subsection 1964(c) leaves open what the full extent
	and nature of the sustained and recoverable damages may be.

	Had Congress intended that compensable damages be completely
	unrestricted, it might have written "any damages he sustains";
	it did not so write.  Using the simple article "the", not
	choosing the reflexive construction "these", signals an intent
	that "the damages" may not be any separate damage, but must
	be connected in some proximate way to the required damages
	to "business and property".

	Moreover, in SEDIMA, the court held that there was no such
	thing as a "racketeering injury", and that despite the
	suggestion in 1964(c) that injury had to flow from a violation
	of 1962, the Court argued that eventually the injury could
	also flow from the predicate acts of 1961, using the liberal
	construction clause.

	In the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, with whom
	Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Powell joined
	   "In addition, the statute [RICO] permits recovery only for
	   injury to business or property. It therefore excludes
	   recovery for personal injuries.  However, many of the
	   predicate acts listed in 1961 threaten or inflict personal
	   injuries - such as murder and kidnaping.  If Congress in fact
	   intended the victims of the predicate acts to recover for
	   their injuries, as the Court holds it did, it is inexplicable
	   why Congress would have limited recovery to business or
	   property injury.  It simply makes no sense to allow recovery
	   by some, but not other victims of predicate acts, and to make
	   recovery turn solely on whether the defendant has chosen to
	   inflict personal pain or harm to property in order to
	   accomplish its end."

	has argued against the broadening of the interpretation in
	the flow of damages, thereby seemingly reducing any exclusionary
	or prohibitive interpretation regarding the types of damages
	that may be alleged and recovered, reductio ad absurdum.

	However, if one accepts the reasoning of SEDIMA, and then
	follows the logic of Justice Marshall, the step in logic
	does not have to be that of Justice Marshall that the flow
	of injury should never have been broadened in the first place,
	but rather that it has indeed been broadened, and that this
	necessitates a further logical broadening in the concept
	of what damages are actually compensable.

	Plaintiffs note that SEDIMA does, in fact, state that in
	regard to violations of 1962(c), "In addition, the plaintiff
	only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that,
	he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct
	constituting the violation." in reading the Statute regarding
	recoverable damages, although this severe restriction is not
	literally present in the Statute per se; the dissenting Justices
	are also then at odds with that inclusion on the bases of equity,
	logic and reason.  With respect to the opinion in SEDIMA, it
	is possible to reconcile Justice Marshall's dissenting argument
	with the majority opinion, by making the extension that Justice
	Marshall actually suggests, and arriving at a consistent
	statutory interpretation.

	THEREFORE, the court should construe the remedial powers
	of RICO within its literal wording regarding damages that
	may be recovered, in this case, and construe those remedial
	powers in terms of the equity, logic and reason of statutory
	entirety, and the intent of the liberal construction clause.
	To allow that although business or property damages must be
	present, and that the compensable damages must contain them,
	but also to allow that the totality of damages compensable
	may be greater than simply and strictly those of business
	or property.

	Not to construe this extension of compensable damages would
	appear to be at odds with Court's expressed opinion in SEDIMA,
	combined with the language of the statute itself.

	Respectfully Submitted:

        William C. Hammel                     Alan J. Bellamente
        A-11 Moose Branch Road,               A-11 Moose Branch Road,
	Sweetwater Apartments 1A,             Sweetwater Apartments 8A,
        Robbinsville, NC 28771                Robbinsville, NC 28771
        (828) 479-1547                        (828) 479-1547

                    /S/                                 /S/
        -------------------------------      ------------------------------
        William C. Hammel                     Alan J. Bellamente

        DATE: February 4, 2000                DATE: February 4, 2000

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Created: February 4, 2000
Last Updated: May 28, 2000